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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
South Korea’s low carbon and ‘green growth’ policies possess potential regulatory 
changes that reduce foreign investors’ interests and legitimate expectations concerning the 
profitability of their businesses.  Although international investment law protects a 
government’s right to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as environmental 
protection, the investor-State dispute settlement provision allows foreign investors to seek 
compensation for a country’s law and policies contrary to their interests.  On the other 
hand, investor-State dispute settlement provisions inherently have many problems.  Despite 
the problems, protecting both foreign investors’ interests and States’ regulatory 
sovereignty is very important.  For this reason, this dissertation examined why the tension 
between foreign investors’ rights and States’ regulatory sovereignty arises and how to solve 
this tension.  This dissertation especially reviewed whether there is a possibility that U.S. 
investors will bring a claim against South Korea for infringing their property rights, 
because the Korean government’s environmental measures may amount to an indirect 
expropriation or a breach of fair and equitable treatment under the KORUS FTA and 
ultimately suggested ways to reconcile Korean environmental protection policies and U.S. 
investors’ interests under the KORUS FTA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  
In the modern world, awareness of the need for environmental protection has 
become increasingly important.  Many States, including both developed and developing 
countries, are creating laws and policies to resolve environmental problems and issues.  As 
a result of these efforts, States are continuously trying to change their environmental 
regulations and permits to improve their public interests, such as for environmental 
protection.  However, from foreign investors’ perspectives, their predictions for regulatory 
stability would be reduced by changes to environmental regulations.  For this reason, a 
tension between foreign investors’ interests and States’ regulatory sovereignty often arises.  
To clarify the legal situation for both States and foreign investors, international investment 
treaties, such as free trade agreements, simultaneously provide protective provisions for 
both foreign investors and States regarding environmental measures; they also seek ways 
to balance between the two significant rights.  
 
South Korea’s low carbon and ‘green growth’ policies represent the kind of 
potential regulatory changes that might interfere with investors’ interests and expectations.  
Additionally, the potential for green regulatory policies to interfere with investors’ property 
rights could result in a paralysis of the environmental protection policies of South Korea.  
This is because the interferences could lead investors to file suits claiming that the 
government’s environmental regulations amounted to indirect expropriations1 and a breach 
of the fair and equitable treatment standard.  
                                                        
1 “States have recognized the importance of attracting foreign direct investment and thus do not want to be 
perceived as threatening those investments by means of expropriation, hence, the typical form in which they 
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This dissertation deals with the increasingly prominent view that investment law 
may sometimes create obstacles to the transition towards a green economy model, because 
the green model requires significant changes to regulatory frameworks.  South Korea’s low 
carbon and ‘green growth’ policies represent potential regulatory changes that interfere 
with investors’ interests and expectations regarding the profitability of their ventures.  
Additionally, investor-State dispute settlement provisions inherently have problems, and, 
as such, the provisions are a serious threat to Korean environmental law and policy.  
Despite the problems, however, Korea’s FTA with the United States, Australia, Canada, 
Vietnam, and China includes ISDS provisions.  For these reasons, there is a natural tension 
between U.S. investors’ rights and Korean environmental protection policy.  Accordingly, 
this dissertation suggests ways to reconcile Korean environmental protection policies and 
U.S. investors’ interests under the KORUS FTA.  
 
Chapter I of this dissertation analyzes the legal status of the KORUS FTA, the 
relationship between foreign investors’ rights and States’ regulatory sovereignty, and the 
current investor-State dispute settlement system’s problems.  Chapter II explains the 
important elements for a good environmental policy design and describes Korea’s 
environmental policy problems.  Chapter III analyzes how States’ changes to 
environmental regulations affect foreign investors’ legitimate expectations.  In this Chapter, 
various international arbitration cases are introduced and many reasonable alternatives are 
                                                        
occur today is that of an indirect expropriation.” ANNE K. HOFFMANN, ‘INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION,’ in A. 
REINISCH, ed., STANDARD OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 152 (2008); “The factors that can be isolated are that 
there is a diminution in the value of the interest of the foreign investor in the assets, and that the time period 
over which this occurs is often longer than necessary for a single act, but there are not factors that contribute 
to the formulation of a single rule that describes the process.” M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 369 (2010).   
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suggested.  In the last Chapter, this dissertation suggests ways to reconcile Korean 
environmental protection policies with U.S. investors’ interests under the KORUS FTA.  
Generally, this dissertation is an attempt to identify and analyze important legal issues 
raised by the interactions between foreign investment and environmental protection in 
contemporary international law.   
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CHAPTER I.    THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE KORUS FTA & INVESTOR-  
                           STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to analyze the legal status of the KORUS FTA, the 
tension between foreign investors’ rights and States’ regulatory sovereignty, and the 
current Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system’s problems.  The first part of the 
Chapter explains the relationship between international law and domestic law:  this part 
especially describes the relationship between international law and Korean Constitutional 
law, and, ultimately, this part discusses where the KORUS FTA lies hierarchically in the 
Korean legal system.  The second part of the Chapter examines why the tension between 
foreign investors’ rights and States’ regulatory sovereignty arises and how to resolve this 
tension.  The third part of the Chapter includes analysis of the current ISDS system’s 
advantages and disadvantages.  This Chapter also explains why the United States and South 
Korea agreed to ISDS provisions and explains the way these ISDS provisions are embodied 
in the KORUS FTA. 
 
 
2. The Legal Status of the KORUS FTA 
 
 
 
A. The Relationship between International Law and Domestic Law 
 
 
 
There is still a debate regarding the relationship between international law and 
domestic law.  This debate arises from the differences in how each national legal system 
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deals with the problems caused by international law.2  International law broadly governs 
the jurisdiction of States and the regulation of relationships between States.3  On the other 
hand, today, international laws are involved in States’ domestic matters—affecting issues 
such as the emission of greenhouse gasses and economic activities.4  A question that arises 
is how international law has an impact on national systems of law.  One opinion is that “the 
future of international law is domestic”:5 this idea suggests a harmony between the areas 
of international law and domestic legal systems—as such, international law can effectively 
and naturally affect both domestic policies and economic activities.6  However, another 
opinion is that international law faces an impossible barrier:7 in other words, that it cannot 
apply to a domestic legal system without first having appropriate domestic procedures in 
place.8  Furthermore, general international rules do not exist regarding whether States 
should apply international law into their domestic legal systems:9  “in fact, there is no 
general obligation that States perform such incorporations of international law.” 10  
Domestic legal systems also do not provide specific rules concerning the relationship 
between international law and domestic law.11  Confronted with these competing theories, 
it is difficult to correctly explain the relationship between international law and domestic 
law. 
 
                                                        
2 See Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, International and Domestic Law: Definitely an Odd Couple, 77 REV. JUR. 
U.P.R. 483 (2008). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 See Slaughter & Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), 
47 HARV. INT'L L. J. 327-28 (2006). 
7 See Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, supra note 2, at 484. 
8 Id. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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As such, to better understand the relationship between international law and 
domestic law, it is necessary to explain the concepts of monism and dualism.  Monists do 
not separate out international and domestic law individually, and they state that 
international law applies directly to national courts;12 on the other hand, from the dualist 
perspective, international law and domestic law are inherently different.13  Dualists state 
that certain actions, such as a legislative act to implement international law, are needed 
before international law can apply directly to national courts.14  Traditional dualist states 
are Australia, Canada, India, Israel, and the United Kingdom.15  Typical monist states 
include Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, South Africa, and the United States.16  
As mentioned in the examples, each State uses one concept—either monism or dualism—
according to its own legal system. 
 
B. The Relationship between International Law and Korean Constitutional Law 
 
 
Before describing the relationship between international law and Korean 
Constitutional law, an explanation about the relationship between treaty law and domestic 
law is necessary.  The advent of new states, and a distrust of forming international custom, 
has brought about the specified treaty laws.17  Treaty laws, such as multilateral laws and 
bilateral laws, allow international law to be more flexible and create better harmony.18  As 
                                                        
12 See S.I. Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty, and Statutory 
Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 499, 510 (2013). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See DAVID SLOSS, TREATY ENFORCEMENT IN DOMESTIC COURTS 7 (2009). 
16 Id. 
17 See Carlos Jose Gutierrez, Conflicts between Domestic and International Law, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 147, 149 
(1980). 
18 Id. 
 14 
a result, international law has increasingly featured greater classification than before.19   
“The supremacy of international law prioritizes international law over national law: when 
a conflict between a treaty and domestic law arises, international law will prevail over 
domestic law in the international legal order.”20   However, in the event of a conflict 
between a treaty and domestic law, the parliament’s latest explanation actually determines 
which one takes priority over the other, and most States have stated that their Constitution 
prevails over international law.21  Such states do not respect treaties’ supremacy; instead, 
they require that the effect of international law follow from the substantive and important 
values included in their national law.22  Furthermore, a treaty cannot operate alone:23 in 
other words, each State’s independent government organization, such as the legislative, the 
executive, or the judicial branch, must properly go through the due process procedures 
vested in their national law before treaties can take effect.24   
 
 
Korean Constitutional law explains the relationship between Korean domestic law 
and international law.  According to Section 1 of Article 6 under the Korean Constitutional 
law, “Treaties duly concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and the recognized 
rules of international law shall have the same effect as the domestic laws of the Republic 
of Korea.”25  This provision raises a question regarding whether Korean domestic law 
means Korean Constitutional law.  If Korean domestic law does not mean Korean 
Constitutional law, the question arises as to whether or not Korean domestic law means 
                                                        
19 Id. 
20 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
21 See ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, THE EFFECTS OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 143, 144 (2014). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 123. 
24 Id. 
25 Amended 1948 DAEHAN MINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITION] art. 6 (1) (Oct. 29, 1987) (S. Kor.).  
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Korean legislation.  From the perspective of the majority, treaties have the same effect as 
legislation.  The Korean Constitutional Court and the Korean Supreme Court have stated 
“that treaties stands comparison with legislation even though there are different opinions 
regarding the relationship between Korean domestic law and international law.”26  In other 
words, treaties are hierarchically beneath Korean Constitutional law.  They have 
furthermore held that, if treaties are properly concluded and promulgated, international law 
does not need to be translated into national law:27 in other words, they are just incorporated 
and have effects automatically in domestic laws.28  This means that the Korean legal system 
accepts monism as the proper relationship between domestic law and international law, 
while provisions of the KORUS FTA are lower, hierarchically, than Korean Constitutional 
law. 
 
C. Foreign Investors’ Rights and State’s Regulatory Sovereignty 
 
From an international investment treaties’ perspective, the protection of foreign 
investors is very important.  States could change their regulations existing at the time of 
investment and the judicial system of the host State could end up enforcing the new 
regulations—a weakness when it comes to foreign investment protection.29  When foreign 
investors decide to invest, they consider not only the State’s laws but also the business 
circumstances surrounding the time of the investment.30  If regulatory changes occur, or 
                                                        
26 Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 1997 Hun-Ga14 (consol.), Apr. 29, 1999 (S.Kor.). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 GEBHARD BÜCHELER, PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 186 (2015). 
30 Anatole Boute, The Potential Contribution of International Investment Protection Law to Combat Climate 
Change, 27 No. 3 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 333, 335 (2009). 
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are reinforced by “the dependence of such investments on public support mechanisms and 
regulatory commitments,” 31  then foreign investors’ expectations regarding their 
investments would be undermined.32 
 
However, apart from the protection of investors, “international investment law has 
recently also included provisions regarding the importance of non-economic factors, such 
as human, animal, and plant life or health, or the environment.” 33   In other words, 
international investment law recognizes a need to find a balance between foreign investors’ 
rights and the regulatory sovereignty of the State.34  There are a number of examples 
featuring this idea’s implementation—“Investment agreements such as the Energy Charter 
Treaty or the NAFTA began to include provisions about non-economic factors in their 
preamble as follows: the parties ‘undertake each of the preceding (investment and trade 
objectives) in a manner consistent with environment protection and conservation, preserve 
their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare.’”35  Furthermore, the 2012 US Model BIT 
explains, through its preamble, that this other purpose of the BIT is to be achieved “in a 
manner consistent with the protection of health, safety and the environment.”36  This 2012 
US Model BIT imposes a strict obligation on the parties—for example, “the parties do not 
waive or derogate from domestic environmental or labor laws, and it mandates that the 
parties ‘effectively enforce’ these rules.”37   A new clause provides parties with more 
regulatory space regarding “regulatory, compliance, investigatory, and prosecutorial 
                                                        
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 346. 
33 Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U. 
PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 35 (2014). 
34 Id. at 36. 
35 Id. at 37. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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matters, and to make decisions on the allocation of resources to enforcement about other 
environmental matters determined to have higher priorities.”38 Obviously, international 
investment law has started to be interested in protecting public interests such as health and 
environmental problems and has sought ways to balance between foreign investors’ rights 
and the State’s regulatory framework.  This idea has been reflected in many international 
investment treaties. 
 
3. International Investment Treaty 
 
 In order to provide investment protection, international investment treaties provide 
foreign investors with numerous general protections.  For example, they have the right to 
bring disputes before international arbitration tribunals.  Also, to attract foreign investors’ 
investment, international investment treaties provide protections to reduce the State’s 
regulatory risk; in other words, the probability that the rules existing at the time of 
investment will change.39  International investment laws, such as bilateral or multilateral 
treaties, provide protection against possible regulatory changes and attempt to increase the 
stability of the investment environment for investors40 by providing “foreign investors with 
protection against expropriation and discriminatory treatment and guaranteeing them fair 
and equitable treatment.” 41   For instance, without treaty protection, low-carbon 
investments to protect the environment could face regulatory changes that might endanger 
                                                        
38 Id. at 38. 
39 See BÜCHELER, supra note 29, at 181. 
40 See Boute, supra note 30, at 335. 
41 Id. 
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their business.42  Clearly, international investment treaties give foreign investors secure 
protections against the risk of regulatory intervention by the State. 
 
On the other hand, scholars and practitioners criticize international investment 
treaties as threats to the sovereignty of states in implementing their environmental 
regulations.43  However, international investment law pursues the protection of investors 
and investments, as well as the promotion of the general welfare through foreign direct 
investment.44  For example, “investments in infrastructure projects are generally exposed 
to a danger and need the infusion of a large amount of capital for a long time”;45 as such, 
they are very sensitive to political changes in the host state.46  As a result, such investors 
require stability regarding the administrative decisions made by the host state.47   
 
A. History 
 
 International investment treaties have a long history. 48   To fully explain the 
advantages and disadvantages of investment treaties, this paper needs to briefly describe 
the history of the bilateral investment treaty and ask whether BITs have had a positive 
effect on global society, along with whether they have significantly affected the global 
economy.  
 
                                                        
42 Id. at 346. 
43 Id. at 365. 
44 See Wagner, supra note 33, at 35. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L 
L. & POL'Y 157 (2005). 
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(1) Colonial Era 
 
Before the Second World War, foreign direct investment protection did not receive 
attention in international agreements.49  Most international investment treaties concerned 
themselves with establishing trade relations; however, these treaties sometimes included 
provisions regarding the protection of property for nationals of one party from the actions 
of another country. 50   In other words, although there were treaties with international 
investment protection, detailed provisions were not explained in the treaties.51 
  
In the Colonial Era, the international investment regime had several 
characteristics.52  First, states negotiated both trade and property provisions in a single 
agreement.53  Second, treaties played an important role in building commercial relations.54  
Third, treaties were limited in scope and the afforded protections were weak, particularly 
because the treaties provided no means for enforcement.55  Thus, it was possible that non-
legal methods, like military force or diplomacy, offered the principal means for foreign 
investment protection.56  
 
(2) The Post-Colonial Era 
 
                                                        
49 Id. at 158. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 161. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
55  See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BIT really work? An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 68 (2005). 
56 See Vandevelde, supra note 48, at 161. 
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During this period, the content of international investment agreements possessed 
other characteristics.57  First, as a “response to the severe economic depression that had 
preceded the Second World War and been worsened by the protectionist policies of the 
1920s,” 58  the victorious allies made it possible to reach a consensus regarding the 
liberalization of trade.59  In 1947, “that consensus produced the signing of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which shifted the primary legal framework for 
international trade relations from bilateral to multilateral agreements.”60  Bilateral trade 
agreements began to decrease in importance, because the GATT became the main forum 
for international trade negotiations.61  The second feature in this era was the decolonization 
that began after the war and brought about the emergence of newly independent states.62  
However, these newly independent states were economically undeveloped countries.63  
Furthermore, these newly independent states were severely protective of their 
independence and regarded foreign investment as a form of neocolonialism.64  The new 
countries also feared that foreign investors would interfere with the host states’ domestic 
affairs; the fear was that trade between developed and developing countries would result 
in the exploitation of the developing countries.65  As such, many developing countries 
closed their economies to new foreign investment and began to expropriate existing 
investment.66  They also adopted import substitution policies; specifically, they would 
                                                        
57 Id. 
58 See BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHAEL KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM, 2-3 (1995). 
59 See RONDO CAMERON, A CONCISE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 370-71 (1997). 
60 See Vandevelde, supra note 48, at 161. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 166. 
63 Id. 
64 See DEAN HANINK, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY: A GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE 234 (1994). 
65 See BARRY W. POULSON, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 39 (1994). 
66 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 55, at 75. 
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prefer to produce needed goods and services locally rather than import them from 
developed countries.67  The reason why these newly independent countries took a very 
hostile position toward foreign investment was that they needed to preserve their wealth.68  
 
Developed countries suggested an alternative to the problem of uncompensated 
expropriation by creating the bilateral investment treaty (BIT).69  “The United Nations’ 
Charter, adopted at the end of the war, prohibited the use of military force except in self-
defense, which rendered the use of force to collect debts or protect investment illegal under 
international law.”70  Considering the severe weakness of customary international law as a 
means of protecting international investment, BITs provided the most effective means for 
preventing uncompensated expropriations.71  
 
 One of the BIT’s major innovations was its arbitration provision, in which the host 
state consented to arbitration of certain disputes with investors.72  Also, the BITs did not 
require investors to seek local remedies before going to international arbitration.73  BIT 
provisions that provided investors with a legal remedy depoliticized investment disputes:74 
in other words, BITs added investment protection as a new area of the law.75  For these 
reasons, if there is an arbitration provision between investors and host countries’ 
                                                        
67 See JOHN RAPLEY, UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE THIRD WORLD 22-25 
(1996). 
68 See Vandevelde, supra note 48, at 167. 
69 See Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on 
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT’L L. 655, 657 (1990). 
70 See Vandevelde, supra note 48, at 169. 
71 Id. 
72 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Alb., Jan. 11, 1995, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-19 (1995). 
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governments in the BIT, this provision will allow the parties to resolve their investment 
disputes using ICSID guidelines.76 
 
(3) The Global Era 
 
 The global era reflects deep changes in the way international investment 
agreements are negotiated, as international investors continue to move into developing 
markets.77  One of the most important changes in the past two decades has been the 
intermingling of trade and investment provisions in international agreements. 78  
Furthermore, a proliferation in the number of BITs has taken place in this Global Era.  It is 
likely that this proliferation demonstrates two major features.79  First, “the proliferation of 
BITs represents a victory of market ideology”:80  “Several Asian countries had high rates 
of private investment and production of goods for export about that of other developing 
countries”;81 by signing more BITs, these Asian countries demonstrated confidence in the 
constructive role that foreign investment and global integration can play in developing 
economies.82  Second, there was a loss of alternatives to foreign investment as a source of 
capital.83  For instance, “the 1980s’ debt crisis reduced the availability of private lending, 
which accounted for half of all capital flows to developing countries by 1980.”84  
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For both these reasons, developing countries started to abandon their hostility 
towards foreign investment and sought ways to attract foreign investment by creating a 
favorable international environment.85  Furthermore, developing countries made a more 
proactive effort to attract foreign investment by guaranteeing their support of the market 
economy and a secure investment environment.86  One mechanism that they used to create 
a more secure investment environment involved concluding BITs that had provisions for 
protection of foreign investment.87  
 
Still, the Global Era’s BITs have changed little in nature since the Post-Colonial 
Era:88 these more recent BITs still principally address the traditional investment protection 
problems.89  “The U.S.’s BITs and a few others have incorporated some changes that were 
largely in reaction to arbitral claims filed under the NAFTA investment chapter, but that 
did not alter the basic nature of the treaty.”90  These changes included the addition of 
language specific to “the fair and equitable treatment standard” and that clarified the 
expropriation provision.91  There were also changes modifying procedures for arbitrations 
under the investor-state dispute resolution provision.92  As a result, BITs in the global era 
have contained more than just investment promotion.  Today, investment treaties not only 
provide very important principles for foreign investors but also build a systematic structure 
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for investment protection.93  As mentioned above, BITs have evolved through a process of 
development for a long period of time.  At the same time, their advantages and 
disadvantages have begun to become clear. 
 
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Investment Treaties 
 
(1) Advantages of Investment Treaties 
 
 Investment treaties have some positive effects on foreign investments.  The first 
advantage of investment treaties is their promotion of investment:94 developed States are 
inclined to promote investments “by inducing the developing host States to remove 
obstacles in their regulatory systems.”95  Furthermore, if a developing State enacts a law 
impeding the investment of a foreign investor, the foreign investor can file a lawsuit against 
the host State for arbitration.96  Investment treaties seem to demand that the host State 
create an investment environment that is helpful to foreign investors.97  When the investor 
decides to invest, investment treaties have an effect on the investor’s decision; however, it 
seems that government policies and national economic conditions play an even more 
important role in the decision of the investor.98  “Thus, developed States tend to conclude 
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investment treaties only with those developing States whose laws and policies offer 
sufficient protection, and are favorable to, international investment.”99   
 
Usually, investment treaties tend to guarantee investment protection: 100  this is 
another advantage of investment treaties.101  “Investment treaties serve as a means through 
which States establish mechanisms for protecting the foreign investments of their nationals 
against the adverse actions of the host States’ government.”102  Developed countries utilize 
investment treaties as a means to protect their property all over the world.103  Moreover, 
investment treaties enable the parties to use an international legal system, like 
arbitration.104  This dispute resolution system gives the investor a chance to escape from 
the uncertainty that arises when foreign investors rely on the domestic law of the host State, 
which might not provide sufficient investment protection for them. 105   These broad 
protections reduce the investor’s burden and allow the promotion of investment.106  As a 
result, investment treaties have accelerated the promotion and protection of investments. 
 
(2) Disadvantages of Investment Treaties 
 
Despite the fact that investment treaties have some advantages, there are also 
disadvantages concerning investment treaties.  First, inequality in bargaining power exists 
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between developed and developing States. 107   Economic inequality exists between 
developed and developing States;108 thus, the claimed benefits resulting from investment 
treaties are apt to lean in the direction of the developed States.109  Second, when it comes 
to defending investment cases in arbitration, developing states are concerned about the high 
expenses: 110  “investment treaties have been criticized on the ground of their cost 
implications on the host States in defending claims brought about them by the foreign 
investors.”111  Last, the international arbitration system created under investment treaties 
gives a disadvantage to the host State.112  The host States are often developing States.113  
Usually, these developing States’ economic and political situations are unstable;114 thus, 
these situations trigger arbitration claims that might place the host State in trouble 
economically and politically.115  Although investment treaties have some disadvantages, 
many countries prefer concluding bilateral investment treaties, such as free trade 
agreements.  Interestingly, when two countries enter into BITs they tend to place investor-
State dispute settlement provisions into their BITs, and this phenomenon has been 
increasing steadily despite the fact that the provisions of investor-State dispute settlement 
are clearly unfavorable to developing countries. 
 
4. Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
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Usually, governments tend to encourage foreign and domestic investment to foster 
their country’s economic growth;116 as such, the need for creating protections for foreign 
investors against host governments arose. 117   One provision that can be included in 
investment treaties to promote this protection is called an investor-State dispute settlement 
(ISDS) system: under the ISDS system, foreign investors have the right to demand 
international arbitration against a host State when they believe that the host State has not 
observed an international investment treaty.118  However, the problem is that the current 
system involving ISDS has been seriously criticized.119  As such, this paper examines the 
flaws of the current ISDS system and how the KORUS FTA deals with ISDS provisions. 
 
A. Structural Defects of ISDS 
 
An ISDS arbitration proceeding inherently involves many structural defects, which 
have a negative effect on the proceeding’s decisions.  One of the serious problems involves 
the lack of transparency in ISDS arbitration proceedings, due to the essentially secretive 
nature of the arbitration process: 120  if both parties agree, ISDS provisions prohibit 
documents related to their suit from being open to the public. 121   Disclosing these 
documents to the public would improve the transparency of the proceedings and decrease 
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corporate corruption.122  I think that guaranteeing the transparency of the ISDS system 
could prevent host States’ policy constraints and increase foreign investors’ legitimate 
expectations.  The second issue is the cost of ISDS arbitration.123  “The rules of cost 
allocation among parties are very flexible and can create uncertainty for both claimants and 
respondents”; 124  as a result, the financially stronger party will gain an advantage in 
ISDS.125  I think that countries, and foreign investors who do not have sufficient capital, 
might face a considerable economic burden in arbitration.  Third, “under the ICSID and 
UNCITRAL rules, ISDS arbitrators are selected on a case-by-case basis”126—“if the parties 
do not agree on another method, each party may appoint one arbitrator, and those two 
chosen arbitrators appoint a third arbitrator.” 127   The current ISDS system results in 
conflicts of both parties’ interests and concerns that the arbitrators are unfair.128  Fourth, 
the appointed arbitrators have a great deal of flexibility to interpret and apply investment 
treaties;129 as such, inconsistent interpretations regarding the meaning of important treaty 
provisions have resulted in uncertainty.130  This lack of consistency in ISDS decisions 
results in future cases having unforeseeable decisions.131  Finally, a persistent criticism of 
the international investment arbitration process is that ISDS is likely to come to the wrong 
holding, but an appellate procedure does not exist to serve as a corrective mechanism.132  
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The absence of an appellate mechanism decreases ISDS’s transparency and predictability 
for host States and investors.133  The ISDS system fundamentally includes many structural 
problems, but nevertheless, many U.S. FTAs including the KORUS FTA have ISDS 
provisions.   
 
B. ISDS in the KORUS FTA 
 
The U.S. Congress approved the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) 
on October 12, 2011, and South Korea’s National Assembly approved it on November 22, 
2011.134  The FTA took effect in March 2012.135  “The United States and South Korea 
entered into the KORUS FTA to reinforce their economic relationship by reducing barriers 
to trade and investment”;136 as trade and business transactions between the United States 
and South Korea flourish, U.S. investors are taking an interest in the investment 
environment within South Korea.137  In the KORUS FTA, “the U.S. government seeks to 
reinforce protections for U.S. investors through various rules on expropriation, 
performance requirements, transparency, and non-discriminatory national treatment 
standards - these serve to protect investment profits against potential political 
disturbance.”138  “To resolve investor disputes, the United States and South Korea agreed 
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to provide for investor-state dispute settlement.”139  This mechanism allows U.S. or Korean 
investors to seek arbitration directly against a host state’s government.140     
 
There are several political reasons why the United States and South Korea agreed 
to have provisions for investor-State dispute settlement.  Managing a strong diplomatic 
relationship is very important to both the United States and South Korea:141 the KORUS 
FTA has a great purpose in both reinforcing the business relationship and fostering a 
partnership between the two countries. 142   On the other hand, a friendly diplomatic 
relationship between the two countries includes greater risk:143 the KORUS FTA will 
contribute to considerable investment promotion in both countries, and this investment 
facilitation will bring about investment-related disputes.144  When deciding what type of 
investor-State dispute settlement should be included in the KORUS FTA, the United States 
and South Korea agreed to decrease any risks that might affect the diplomatic relationship 
between the two countries.145  “Investor-State dispute settlement provisions are less of a 
diplomatic risk than state-to-state dispute settlement provisions”: 146  in State-to-State 
dispute settlement, if investors have used up domestic remedies provided by the host 
State’s courts, the investors can require their home State to bring a claim against the host 
State.147  In this regard, “a state fundamentally changes a private claim into a diplomatic 
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dispute”148—if the KORUS FTA included state-to-state dispute settlement provisions, 
diplomatic disputes would occur and would weaken the relationship between the U.S. and 
South Korea. 149   Contrary to this, investor-State dispute settlements undermine the 
importance of investors’ home States.150  In other words, investors can file a suit against 
the host State directly.  Furthermore, investor-State dispute settlement is less politically 
sensitive:151 an investor can file a suit against a host State without the help of his home 
state government;152 as a result, the investor’s home state can keep a good relationship with 
the host State during disputes. 153   However, the provision for ISDS is inherently 
unfavorable to South Korea, because South Korea’s economic and political situations are 
highly unstable: these unpredictable situations could result in U.S. investors making claims 
through the ISDS provisions in the KORUS FTA. 
 
According to the KORUS FTA’s investment Chapter, “the KORUS FTA does not 
allow the Parties to expropriate or nationalize covered investments, whether directly or 
indirectly, through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization unless: it is for 
a public purpose; done in a non-discriminatory manner; provides payment of prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation; and is executed in accordance with due process of 
law.” 154   In particular, within the Annex on Expropriation, there is a provision that 
maintains “non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied 
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the 
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environment, except in rare circumstances, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”155  
According to Korean Constitutional law, all citizens have the right to a healthy and pleasant 
environment; 156  as such, the State and all citizens shall endeavor to protect the 
environment. 157   However, when a U.S. investor brings a claim against the Korean 
government to an arbitration tribunal, “the tribunal shall decide the issues in dispute in 
accordance with provisions of the KORUS FTA and applicable rules of international 
law.”158  As a result, despite the fact that the KORUS FTA lies hierarchically under Korean 
Constitutional law, one predictable outcome of the ISDS provisions is that U.S. investors 
might challenge South Korea’s environmental laws and policies.  Although the KORUS 
FTA protects a government’s right to maintain measures that guarantee investment 
activities and that protect legitimate public welfare objectives, including the environment, 
the investor-State dispute settlement provision enables investors to seek compensation for 
environmental laws and policies contrary to their interests.159  Therefore, there remains a 
question of how to balance both investors’ interests and state measures regarding subjects 
such as environmental policy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter discussed three major issues. First, based upon the analysis above, 
when it comes to the relationship between domestic law and international law, the Korean 
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legal system permits treaties to automatically affect domestic laws.  Thus, the KORUS 
FTA has the same hierarchical position as Korean legislation; in other words, it is 
hierarchically beneath Korean Constitutional law.  As such, provisions providing for 
investor-State dispute settlement in the KORUS FTA pose a possible threat to Korean 
Constitutional law and policy, because in the event that a U.S. investor files a suit against 
the Korean government to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), the Tribunal can deal with the dispute according to the provisions of the KORUS 
FTA and international law.  For this reason, the Tribunal decision could paralyze South 
Korea’s law and environmental policy.  Second, concerning foreign investors’ rights and 
States’ regulatory sovereignty, international investment treaties provide protection for 
foreign investors against regulatory risks from the State.  However, they also include 
provisions for the protection of public interests, such as resolving health and environmental 
problems.  As a result, a tension between both interests naturally arises and international 
investment treaties try to find ways to balance between the two important interests.  Third 
and last, this Chapter analyzed the current ISDS system.  The current ISDS system greatly 
disadvantages countries whose political and economic statuses are unstable.  Indeed, this 
unsteady situation within developing countries is highly likely to bring about arbitration 
claims at foreign investors’ requests.  Furthermore, the current ISDS system inherently has 
many structural problems that can trigger constraints on a host State’s regulatory space.  
Therefore, this Chapter ultimately poses the question of how to balance both foreign 
investors’ interests and State measures. 
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CHAPTER II. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY & CRITICISM OF KOREA’S 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this Chapter is to explain how countries make an effort to resolve 
environmental problems and issues, including how awareness of the need for 
environmental protection is increased.  Furthermore, this Chapter examines the elements 
needed to produce good policy design.  Next there is an explanation concerning why, when 
the need for environmental regulations changes, environmental regulations change and 
foreign investors’ predictability is therefore reduced.  This Chapter ends by analyzing the 
environmental chapter of the KORUS FTA and describing Korea’s current environmental 
policy problems.  
 
2. Environmental Law and Policy 
 
A. Background 
 
As time has passed, our environmental law and policy have become increasingly 
important.  Most environmental legislation systems appeared after the industrial 
revolution, 160  when rapid urbanization brought about various new environmental 
problems. 161   Therefore significant institutions, such as environmental ministries and 
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national agencies, were empowered to develop the new laws.162  For example, “states 
imposed restrictions on land use and private and public activities to protect endangered 
species and try to control waste and chemical diffusion.”163  On the other hand, several 
developing countries still do not realize the importance of environmental problems and 
their essential environmental institutions are not functioning well.164   
 
Though modern environmental law has dealt with local environmental problems—
such as air pollution, waste disposal, and pest control—global environmental issues and 
concerns, such as global warming and climate change, have started appearing since the 
1980s and 1990s.165  Furthermore, transnational actors such as multinational corporations 
(MNCs) are leading the global economy, and they are exercising broad influence all over 
the world.166  Thus, environmental issues became part of global issues, and environmental 
problems have had a serious negative impact on people who live around the world; as such, 
organizations of governments and individuals are making an effort to decrease 
environmental problems. 
 
B. Developing Countries’ Environmental Law 
 
Most developing countries comparatively lack an understanding of environmental 
protection, compared to developed countries.  However, developing countries’ 
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environmental laws and policies share general characteristics.167  First, developing states 
rely more on foreign investments to obtain economic benefits than do developed states.168  
Furthermore, the people who live in developing countries are especially vulnerable to 
environmental damage: 169  this is because “developing states have many structural 
drawbacks about environmental administration, such as inexperienced and underpaid staff, 
often under the jurisdiction of different authorities, and risk of corruption.”170  Developing 
states’ environmental authorities lack the budget and skill to monitor their environmental 
quality,171 and it is uncommon for NGOs, foreign institutions, or international associations 
to monitor the quality of the environment.172  Moreover, developing countries tend to be 
less interested in environmental problems due to their lack of environmental knowledge 
and low living standards:173  “those weaknesses may contribute to the favoring of direct 
regulations, plain prohibitions, and sanctions, instead of administratively complex systems 
like cap-and-trade systems.”174  To reduce the difference between developed countries and 
developing countries, global institutions such as the World Commission on Environment 
and Development work to find new ideas to protect the environment. 
 
C. Sustainable Development 
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Many countries all over the world pursued economic development after the Second 
World War. 175   To decrease poverty in the developing countries and improve living 
standards around the world, economic development has been regarded as an important 
factor.176  During this time, many international institutions and developed countries have 
assisted developing countries in building basic infrastructure for economic growth and 
environmental protection.177  Simultaneously, most developed countries have aimed at 
sustaining economic growth as their priority.178  However, economic development and 
environmental sustainability cannot synergize well with each other during the same 
period.179  For this reason, the idea of sustainable development has become increasingly 
important to the world, and many countries’ environmental laws and policies are dealing 
with this idea as a fundamental principle. 
 
The concept of sustainable development started to receive notice after policy 
makers became interested in the publication of Our Common Future, which is reported by 
the World Commission on Environment and Development.180 
 
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.  It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of “needs,” in 
particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding 
priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of 
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technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet 
present and future needs.181 
 
The purpose of sustainable development includes three important challenges.182  
First, attempting to limit the scale of human activity’s effects on the biosphere.183  Second, 
attempting to fairly distribute the benefits of human activity to all.184  The third and final 
challenge for sustainable development involves finding an efficient allocation for our finite 
resources.185  Advanced environmental policies enable not only stopping degradation but 
also helping to foster sustainable development.186  In this regard, the idea of sustainable 
development has become one of the most important elements when policy makers create 
their country’s environmental policies. 
 
D. Environmental Policy Design 
 
The Purpose of environmental policy is to find ways to reduce the negative impact 
of humanity upon the environment.187  Policy makers use different policy approaches and 
instruments. 188   This dissertation introduces a basic approach and corresponding 
instruments for a good policy design:  a good environmental policy design commonly 
includes elements promoting effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness.189  To properly satisfy 
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a nation’s environmental goals, Sterner190 explains the important elements for good policy 
design as follows: 
 
Cost-effectiveness: if the instrument operates as planned, it would achieve 
the environmental goals at the lowest cost; Effectiveness: a more ambitious 
concept including the optimality of the goal, that is, the level of abatement 
or of resource stock; Sustainability: long-term feasibility and fairness; 
Incentive compatibility: the agents involved (particularly the polluters, but 
also regulators, victims, and others) have an incentive to provide 
information and undertake abatement and so on; Distributional and equity 
concerns: the distribution of costs or responsibilities should be seen as fair; 
and Administrative feasibility: the avoiding of excessive financial or 
informational costs for the operation of the instrument191 
 
 To improve the health and safety of citizens, every country creates its own 
environmental policy.  As described above, there are essential elements, such as 
sustainability and transparency, which are necessary for creating good policymaking.  
Through the harmonization of these crucial elements, more desirable and reasonable 
environmental policies could be created.  To this end, many countries, including developed 
and developing countries, are introducing the idea of sustainable development through their 
environmental policies, and they are continuously seeking to balance between economic 
development and environmental protection.  
 
E. Environmental Law: Regulatory Stability and Predictability for Foreign Investors 
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When investors decide to invest in foreign countries, a secure investment 
environment and regulations’ predictability are significant factors for the investors.192  
However, the government’s regulations are likely to change constantly.  When better ways 
to protect the environment—or prevent human behaviors from harming the environment—
are created, new standards to preserve the environment can be applied.193  Several elements 
have an effect on the changing of environmental regulations:194 specifically, changes to 
environmental quality and the development of new technology to resolve environmental 
problems give rise to changing environmental regulations.195  For instance, if a country’s 
general acceptance about an environmental problem changes, or new scientific knowledge 
appears, their environmental regulations would be altered. 196   Usually, environmental 
regulations provide reasonable regulatory stability for foreign investors. 197   However, 
changes in environmental regulations could have a negative effect on foreign investors’ 
predictability.  For this reason, an environmental regulation needs to balance between the 
need for the rules’ change and the need for foreign investors’ predictability.198  If changes 
in environmental regulations appear within an expected time and improve transparency, 
they would not greatly affect foreign investors’ predictability.199  
 
This relationship between environmental regulations and foreign investors’ 
legitimate expectations is explained well in the Vattenfall v. Germany case.  After a nuclear 
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disaster in Fukushima, Japan in 2011, the German congress decided to phase out its nuclear 
power plants and immediately shut down some of the oldest nuclear power plants that 
Vattenfall, a Swedish energy company, operated.200  Vattenfall brought a claim against 
Germany not only to the ICSID but also to the German Constitutional Court.201  The GCC 
concentrated its analysis on whether Vatenfall should be compensated according to 
German Constitutional law. 202   They explained that the State could freely change its 
regulations to protect public interests, such as public health and the environment. 203  
However, they stated that a State should change its regulations reasonably and foreseeably.  
In other words, that the State should protect foreign investors’ legitimate expectations.  
Furthermore, the GCC reviewed issues concerning private property rights, expropriation, 
and compensation.204  They found that if a State changes its policy, leading to foreign 
investors’ economic loss, then the State should adequately compensate for the investors’ 
economic loss.205  In this case, the GCC found that Germany’s completely altered policy 
regarding their nuclear power plants violated Vattenfall’s property rights. 206   Thus, 
Germany had to compensate for Vattenfall’s economic loss.207  I predict that this case, 
involving Vattenfall’s claim against Germany, might have an effect on future decisions of 
the ICSID.    
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3. Criticism of Korea’s Environmental Policy 
 
Korea has been reinforcing the implementation of its environmental policies.208  
Most of the environmental policies in Korea pursue a harmonization between economic 
growth and environmental protection.209  Environmental non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) not only actively attend to environmental issues but also make an effort to address 
environmental problems.210  The business and industry sectors voluntarily participate in 
the environmental campaign and observe the environmental policies laid forth by the 
Korean government.211  Furthermore, by introducing a monitoring system, the government 
continuously tracks environmental issues.212  Additionally, improved property rights and a 
more efficient legal system make it possible to improve the economy’s quality.213  A stable 
microeconomic environment and sound infrastructure have had positive effects on Korea’s 
economic growth. 214   However, South Korea’s rapid economic development, energy 
intensive industrial expansion, and extremely high population density have still brought 
severe environmental problems; accordingly, South Korea is attempting the transition to a 
low-carbon economy, as clean energy investment and regulations designed to solve 
environmental problems have become increasingly popular throughout the world’s 
strongest economies. 
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A. Korea’s Environmental Policy 
 
 There are vivid examples of South Korea’s environmental policy instability, lack 
of national consensus, and political corruption.  These factors decrease the transparency of 
the government’s policymaking and also decrease regulatory stability and predictability for 
foreign investors. 
 
1) Korea’s Green Growth Policy 
 
South Korea has appeared as the leader of the “Green Growth” concept, which 
pursues harmonization between environmental protection and economic development.215  
The Lee Myung-bak Administration of South Korea introduced the “Low Carbon, Green 
Growth” policy;216 the goal of Green Growth is to simultaneously pursue goals related to 
economic growth and environmental protection.217  In other words, “Green Growth seeks 
to advance the transition from quantitative growth to qualitative growth and the shift from 
the traditional, fossil-fuel dependent socioeconomic structure into a law carbon one.”218 
 
The purpose behind this definition is to clarify that South Korea continuously 
pursues economic growth,219 but green growth in South Korea deals not only with climate 
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change mitigation but also with a reduction in fossil fuel use.220  Indeed, “it penetrated most 
aspects of South Korean society, including both public and private industrial sectors, the 
transportation and building sectors, and the lifestyle and consumption of individuals.”221  
On the other hand, the Park Guen-hye Administration of South Korea condemned the 
“Green Growth” concept for not having a clear conceptual vision and purpose, because 
they viewed the policy as being excessively tilted towards economic growth.222  They also 
criticized the “Green Growth” concept’s pursuit of sustainable development; however, it 
does not clearly explain social equity, which is one of the important principles behind 
sustainable development.223  As a result, under the Park Guen-hye Administration, the 
previous Administration’s environmental policy has not been vigorously enforced.  This 
policy inconsistency has an effect on foreign investors’ legitimate expectations. 
 
2) Korea’s Carbon Emissions Trading System 
 
The Korean business world is aggressively combatting the government’s plan to 
institute a carbon-emission trading system starting from last year.  “The carbon-emission 
trading system aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by setting a quantitative limit on 
CO2 emissions and by allowing participants to trade insufficient or surplus amounts of CO2 
emissions with each other.”224  The South Korean government has announced a 2030 target 
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for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by thirty-seven percent from “BAU”225 (Business 
As Usual).226  The industrial sector’s criticism emphasizes that the government has handled 
this new climate change system without careful examination.227  They are implacably 
opposed to the government’s unilateral policy of enforcement and state that this does not 
reflect Korea’s industrial reality.228  Many economic experts and business owners oppose 
the government’s plan, because the carbon-emissions trading system will raise the cost of 
power generation, which could also hike electricity bills.229  Another issue regarding the 
new policy is that it places the same burden on companies that have been attentive in 
making early reductions to their greenhouse gas emissions. 230   Furthermore, the eco-
friendly system that has already been built could be damaged because of the government’s 
requirement for uniform upper limits.231 
 
3) Korea’s Carbon Tax Policy 
 
The carbon tax policy is also an example of unrealistic environmental policies.  The 
carbon tax policy is designed to create a clean environment by subsidizing consumers who 
buy a car with low carbon emissions and taxing those who purchase a car with high 
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emissions.232  The Korean government is planning to implement its carbon tax policy 
beginning last year; on the other hand, Korea will postpone introduction of a vehicle carbon 
emission tax until 2020.233  According to the Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI), 
this carbon tax policy is not plausible because those who buy imported cars would face a 
lesser burden compared to domestic car buyers, due to the price difference between 
domestic cars and imports.234  Furthermore, KERI questioned whether the carbon tax 
system would improve the environment, because there is no evidence that a carbon tax 
policy would have a positive effect on environmental improvement.235 
 
4) Korea’s Fine Dust Particles 
 
 Fine dust particles are worsening Korea’s air quality every year; as a result, fine 
dust particles have become a serious social and environmental problem in Korea.  Although 
fine dust particles originate in China, car emissions and coal-fired power plants are the 
primary ways that the fine dust particles are produced.236  According to the Financial Times, 
“power from coal-fired plants in Korea increased by whopping 95 percent last year from 
2005.”237  Furthermore, the OECD gave a severe warning that Korea’s air pollution will 
result in Korea having the highest rates of premature death within the OECD member 
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countries by 2060.238  The Korean government will gradually shut down old coal-fired 
power plants that have been operating over thirty years.239  However, it is also planning to 
build nine new coal-fired power plants.240   
 
 I would like to criticize the Korean government’s attitude and inconsistent policy 
regarding coal-fired power plants.  The ministry of Environment said that “62 to 80 percent 
of the fine dust and 84 to 86 percent of the ultra-fine particles polluting air around the 
capital came from overseas.”241  On the other hand, “the Financial Times quoted Kim Shin-
do, professor at the University of Seoul, as saying that just 20 percent of fine dust come 
from China.”242  As a result, it is difficult to trust the announcement regarding fine dust 
particles by the Korean government.  In addition, to decrease fine dust particles, other 
countries such as Norway are encouraging the use of electric vehicles and LPG fuel 
vehicles.243  Yet, “Korean laws restrict personal use of LPG vehicles because of unstable 
LPG fuel supply and reduction of tax revenues.”244  For this reason, car buyers prefer to 
buy diesel vehicles, which have relatively high efficiency and low fuel prices.245  I predict 
that this restriction on the personal use of LPG fuel vehicles might be changed to further 
reduce the production of fine dust particles.  Ultimately, environmental protection policies 
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include long-term uncertainty and regulatory risks; certainly, factors such as policy 
inconsistency and opacity might interfere with foreign investors’ legitimate expectations. 
 
5) Korea’s Political Corruption 
 
A serious and awful political scandal related to the current president recently took 
place in South Korea.246  “South Korea lawmakers had voted to impeach President Park 
Geun-hye for her role in a corruption scandal that has paralyzed the country for two 
months.”247  Subsequently, last March, all eight justices on the Korean Constitutional Court 
unanimously upheld the impeachment motion based on the President’s role in 
corruption.248  “The justices said the president had continuously violated Korean law and 
Constitution.”249  The majority of the people agreed with the impeachment,250  “but it does 
not solve South Korea’s endemic corruption problem.”251  The problem is that the big 
corporations in South Korea, such as Samsung, are related to chronic corruption:252 these 
huge corporations assist the government and gain benefits from it.253  This relationship 
between politicians and business has proven to have a substantial negative effect on Korean 
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society.254  As a result, South Korea’s political corruption could reduce the transparency of 
the government’s policymaking processes.   
 
4. The Environment Chapter of the KORUS FTA 
 
 Korea’s policies do not, however, act in isolation. They are subject to, and 
influenced by, numerous obligations that the Korean government has undertaken—the 
most relevant obligation for this dissertation being the KORUS FTA.  The KORUS FTA 
has a number of elements related to environmental protection that are worth a brief 
discussion. 
 
A. Level of Protection  
 
The Environmental Chapter of the KORUS FTA recognizes “the right of each Party 
to determine its own level of environmental protection; however, it requires both Korea 
and the U.S. to provide and encourage a high level of environmental protection.”255  In 
addition, “both Parties should continue to improve their respective levels of environmental 
protection by applying their own environmental laws and policies.”256 
 
B. Environmental Agreements 
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“The Environment Chapter within the KORUS FTA requires each Party to adopt, 
maintain, and implement laws, and all other measures necessary, in order to fulfill its 
obligations under the seven ‘multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)’”;257 “these 
are CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species), the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Convention on Wetlands 
(Ramsar), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships (Marpol 
73/78), the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMILR), the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, and the 
Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
(IATTC).”258  Korea and the U.S. both agree that MEAs are important tools for protecting 
the environment, domestically and internationally. 
 
C. Application and Enforcement of Environmental Laws 
 
 When problems involving the application and enforcement of environmental laws 
occur, Article 20.3 of the Environment Chapter explains how each Party must observe their 
obligations.  According to Article 20.3(a): (i) “neither party shall fail to effectively enforce 
its environmental laws, and other measures to fulfill its obligations under the covered 
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agreements”; (ii) “through a sustainable or recurring course of action or inaction”; (iii) “in 
a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties.”259  The KORUS FTA does 
not allow the Parties to waive or derogate their environmental laws.260  
 
D. Environmental Cooperation 
 
Today, we are faced with a complicated and wide variety of environmental 
problems that countries all over the world should resolve.  However, every country in the 
world is not confronted with the same circumstances, and each alone does not possess the 
solutions to resolve these environmental issues and problems by itself.  For this reason, 
through the Environment Chapter of the KORUS FTA, Korea and the U.S. both strive to 
find effective ways for environmental protection by cooperating and sharing useful 
information with each other. 261   Both Parties agree that expanding their interactive 
connection in various ways will help them accomplish their environmental goals and 
objectives, such as the development and improvement of environmental protection.262  In 
the Environment Chapter, the agreement between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Republic of Korea on Environmental Cooperation 
(ECA) “is coordinated and reviewed by the implementation body established under the 
ECA” and will help them further the environmental activities of each other.263  
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E. Public Participation 
 
In order to successfully implement the Environment Chapter, the KORUS FTA 
emphasizes the importance of public participation. Growing public concerns about 
environmental issues and problems, and awareness of environmental protection, have 
increased the importance of public participation.  Under the KORUS FTA, any citizen of 
a Party may file a submission with their concerns regarding the implementation of any 
provisions within the chapter.264  “Each Party will respond to these submissions in a 
manner consistent with its own domestic procedures.”265    
 
F. Environmental Affairs Council 
 
The KORUS FTA establishes an Environmental Affairs Council to oversee the 
implementation of the Environmental Chapter. The council is composed of advanced 
government officials from each Party and meets once per year.266  The Environmental 
Affairs Council is responsible for addressing environmental issues first; if EAC does not 
deal with them, then the Joint Committee, which is responsible for the administration of 
the KORUS FTA, discusses the environmental issues.267  The KORUS FTA requires the 
Council to promote public participation, not only by seeking advice from the public in 
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developing agendas for Council meetings, but also by sharing information with the public 
regarding environmental issues.268  In this respect, the Council should give the public 
proper opportunities to engage in cooperative environmental activities.269  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
New concerns about environmental quality, and the development of new 
technology, bring changes to environmental regulations.  These changes to environmental 
regulations affect foreign investors’ predictability.  If changes to environmental regulations 
occur rapidly or suddenly, foreign investors’ predictions about regulatory stability will 
become murky.  In contrast, if changes to environmental regulations occur over a 
reasonable time and involve enhancing transparency, foreign investors’ predictability will 
be guaranteed. Thus, when a State changes its environmental regulations, it should consider 
balancing between the need for the rules’ change and the need for foreign investors’ 
predictability.  
 
According to the environmental chapter of the KORUS FTA, “the United States 
and Korea should continue to improve their respective levels of environmental protection 
by applying their own environmental laws and policies.”270  Furthermore, as mentioned 
previously, various elements such as sustainability, transparency, and public participation 
are needed to make a good policy.  However, Korea’s environmental policy has many 
problems. 
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  Korea is the eleventh largest economy in the world.271  On the other hand, one of 
South Korea’s greatest problems is the government’s inconsistent environmental policies 
and unilateral policy enforcement.  According to the World Economic Forum, South 
Korea’s ranking for policy instability, transparency of government policymaking, and 
burden of government regulation is low.272  More specifically, “policy instability remains 
a concern for doing business and is ranked as the most problematic factor in this respect.”273  
Furthermore, “South Korea ranking on Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index is very poor.”274   
 
From my perspective, political factors have had a harmful influence on 
environmental policy in South Korea.  Whenever a new administration begins, the previous 
administration’s environmental policy is abolished or postponed.  As such, the problem is 
that South Korea’s environmental policy is short on policy consistency.  Moreover, policy 
makers do not pay attention to public opinion; for this reason, the Korean government’s 
unilateral policy-making triggers a lack of national consensus and public participation.  
Political corruption also takes place very often in South Korea.  According to David C. 
Nice, “political corruption reduces public confidence in government action and public 
willingness to trust government agencies with substantial authority or funding.”275  These 
                                                        
271 See He Qi, IMF Statistics Department, Principal Global Indicators, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2014/dgi/pdf/m.pdf. 
272 See Klaus Schwab, World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2016-2017, at 238, 
available at http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index/country-profiles/#economy=KOR 
(Explaining that the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index Report 2016-2017 is a report 
that defines the competitiveness and the level of productivity and the market conditions of 144 economies). 
273 See Klaus Schwab, supra note 213. 
274 See Se-Woong Koo, supra note 247. 
275 See David C. Nice, The Policy Consequences of Political Corruption, Political Behavior (1986), available 
at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/586084.pdf. 
 55 
are all elements that can negatively affect regulatory stability and predictability for foreign 
investors.   
 
In other words, as mentioned previously, the Korean government’s regulatory 
actions to protect public interests are likely to amount to “except in rare circumstance.”  
Under the KORUS FTA, “non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, 
safety, and the environment, except in rare circumstances, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.”276  The effect of the governmental action on investment is the greatest 
factor in assessing whether or not there has been an indirect expropriation:277 as a result, 
some of South Korea’s environmental measures might adversely affect the interests of a 
foreign investor.  For all these reasons, there is the possibility that foreign investors will 
file actions against South Korea for interfering with their property rights; and that they will 
seek international arbitration, because the Korean government’s action amounted to an 
indirect expropriation.   
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CHAPTER III. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND INDIRECT 
EXPROPRIATION & FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to explain the types of governmental measures that 
could amount to an indirect expropriation, examine the essential elements necessary for a 
finding of compensable indirect expropriation, and analyze a conflict between the fair and 
equitable treatment standard (FET) and changes to environmental regulations or permits.  
This Chapter first discusses the relationship between environmental regulations or permits 
and indirect expropriation, with the second part of the Chapter examining how 
environmental regulations affect the FET.  The Chapter analyzes in considerable detail how 
changes to environmental regulations can have an effect on foreign investors’ legitimate 
expectations, playing an important role in the interpretation of the FET and in ultimately 
coming to a determination of indirect expropriation.  This Chapter draws its conclusions 
through the analysis of many investment arbitration cases.   
 
2. Environmental Regulations and Indirect Expropriation 
 
Direct expropriation carries significant dangers, because it often acts to destroy 
foreign direct investment, which harms the countries’ investment climate.278  Additionally, 
countries are worried that such expropriation might trigger a reduction in the influx of 
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foreign capital.279  For these reasons, by the early twenty-first century direct expropriation 
had not occurred often, 280  while cases alleging indirect expropriations are more 
common.281  An indirect expropriation means that states do not touch an investor’s title 
directly, but they either impede an investor’s ability or reduce the benefit from an 
investment considerably. 282   Usually, in an indirect expropriation, States deny an 
expropriation’s existence and justify their actions as a legitimate regulatory exercise.283  
 
To determine whether a States’ regulatory action constitutes an indirect 
expropriation, the 2004 US Model Treaty explains the issue more specifically.  After 
stating in Article 6(1) that “neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered 
investment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or 
nationalization,”284 a special Annex B named “Expropriation” adds:  
 
(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, 
in a specific situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a 
case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: (i) 
the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an 
action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the 
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that 
an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the 
government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-
backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action.285 
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(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by 
a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not 
constitute indirect expropriations.286 
 
This means that when a State’s actions are applied to reasonably protect the public 
welfare, they are not considered an indirect expropriation.  While the 2004 US Model 
Treaty includes an exception for “except in rare circumstances,”287  “it does not totally 
exclude situations where public regulation gives rise to indirect expropriation.”288  The 
KORUS FTA also includes this language. According to the KORUS FTA, “the 
agreement’s expropriation provisions have been clarified in two annexes to ensure that they 
are consistent with U.S. legal principles and practice, including a clarification that non-
discriminatory regulatory actions designed and applied to protect the public welfare do not 
constitute indirect expropriation ‘except in rare circumstances.’”289  On the other hand, the 
problem is that we have no way of knowing the scope of the rare circumstances, nor the 
exact meaning of the phrase. 
  
A. Types of Governmental Policies and Indirect Expropriation 
 
 Various types of governmental measures have an effect on the investment of a 
foreign investor.  According to arbitral tribunals, the following four types of host 
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government measures, discussed in their own subsections, are considered to be indirect 
expropriations: (1) change in government permits or licenses; (2) disproportionate tax 
increases; (3) interference with contractual rights; and (4) unjustified interference with the 
management of the investment.290 
 
(1) Change in Government Permits or Licenses 
 
Although the investor possesses full title and control over the investment, in certain 
situations the revocation or denial of permits by the government amount to an indirect 
expropriation.291  For example, in the case of TECMED v Mexico, the Claimant claimed 
that Mexican authorities modified the investment regarding a landfill after the investment 
was made.292  TECMED had requested that INE (the Environmental Protection Agency) 
renew a permit to operate their landfill.293  However, INE denied TECMED’s request 
because TECMED breached some terms of the permit and applicable regulations.294  The 
INE ordered closure of the landfill, because the wastes in the landfill exceeded the limits 
that the permit allowed. 295   Those violations triggered community groups to oppose 
continued operation of the landfill and civil society groups demanded the landfill’s 
closure.296  The landfill was located near the city of Hermosillo; and, according to the 
Claimant, the new authorities of Hermosillo supported their citizens in opposing the 
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landfill’s operation and requiring its closure.297  The Claimants also argued, first, that 
political circumstances affected the INE’s refusal to renew the license and, second, that 
INE’s action in refusing to extend the authorization to operate the landfill was considerably 
subjective.298   
 
 The Respondent said that such a refusal was not a result of an arbitrary action but 
was a control measure—related to public interests.299  The Respondent pointed out that the 
community group’s negative attitude against the landfill was based, not only on its location, 
but also on the community group’s highly critical view regarding hazardous toxic waste.300  
The Respondent alleged, the “Resolution was a regulatory measure issued in compliance 
with the State’s police power within the highly regulated and extremely sensitive 
framework of environmental protection and public health.”301  Therefore, the Respondent 
concluded that the Resolution was a reasonable action of the state and did not amount to 
an expropriation.302   
 
 On the other hand, the Claimant stated that denying the renewal of the permit was 
not reasonable, because it had operated the landfill for the previous year without any 
problem.303  The Tribunal concluded that the facts of the case indicated that TECMED’s 
breaches of the Permit’s terms and environmental regulations were minor and did not 
“compromise public health, impair ecological balance or protection of the environment.”304  
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The Tribunal also considered whether public opposition to the landfill had generated “a 
genuine social crisis” or “public emergency” justifying non-renewal of the permit.305  
Having analyzed the circumstances surrounding the revocation of the landfill permit, the 
tribunal found that the situation contained no emergency circumstances, serious social 
situation, or even any urgency.306  Therefore, it determined that the measures undertaken 
by the Mexican authorities were not proportional to the aim sought and were therefore 
equivalent to an expropriation.307  
  
(2) Unfair Tax 
 
To limit the activities of foreign investors and investments, host countries can levy 
taxes on investors.308  An example is in Occidental Exploration and Production Company 
v The Republic of Ecuador, where the claimant alleged an indirect expropriation through 
taxation.309  According to the facts of this dispute, during the 1980s and 1990s OEPC 
provided oil production services to Petroecuador, an Ecuadorian State-owned corporation 
responsible for the planning, organization, and operation of hydrocarbon exploration and 
exploitation activities in Ecuador. 310   OEPC produced local products in Ecuador and 
imported goods in connection with the production of oil;311  OEPC paid VAT on these local 
and imported products.312  Eventually, OEPC applied to the Ecuadorian Internal Revenue 
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Service for the refund of VAT payments.313  At first repayments were made; however, the 
SRI passed Resolution 664, which denied the claims of OEPC for VAT tax credits and 
reimbursements.314   
 
The Claimants believed that they had the right to value-added tax (VAT) refunds 
under Ecuador’s tax system at the time of investment.315  The Claimant alleged that by 
“unlawfully, arbitrarily, discriminatorily, and retroactively taking OEPC’s right to VAT 
refunds, Ecuador has expropriated all or part of investment by OEPC.”316 However, “the 
Tribunal held that the measures did not affect a substantial portion and reasonable 
economic benefit of the investment.”317 
 
(3) Changes to Existing Contractual Rights 
 
“Many governmental actions can have a negative effect on an investor’s contractual 
rights.”318  “International law protects contract rights from expropriation, and investment 
treaties have sought to broaden and deepen that protection significantly.”319  Based on such 
treaty provisions, investors can allege that government measures affected their contractual 
rights as if they constituted expropriation.320  An example occurred in CME v. Czech 
Republic, where the investor complained that a government-established regulatory 
authority, the Media Council, interrupted their contractual rights and that such interference 
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weakened the guaranteed license of the investor’s local partner.321  The tribunal found that 
“the regulatory authority had breached the Netherland-Czech Republic BIT’s provision 
against indirect expropriation on the grounds that the Czech Republic forced the investor 
to accept the amendments to the contract.”322  Consequently, this act infringed on CME’s 
legal security.323 
 
(4) Unjustified Interference with the Investment 
 
Finally, an indirect expropriation might occur when governmental measures 
considerably or completely interfere with an investor’s control over an investment.324  
“This can occur when an investor is physically or legally impeded from its management 
tasks or when investor-controlled management is replaced with government-appointed 
management.”325 To assess the extent to which such interference constitutes an indirect 
expropriation, the important element is the degree of the interference.326  An example 
occurred in Biloune v. Ghana, when the investment project to build a restaurant complex 
through the investor’s local subsidiary, MDCL, was impeded.327  When local governmental 
authorities ordered MDCL to stop the project, it was already substantially underway.328  
The tribunal stated, “given the central role of Mr. Biloune in promoting, financing, and 
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managing MDCL, his expulsion from the country effectively prevented MDCL from 
pursuing its project and, therefore, constituted an indirect expropriation of MDCL’s 
contractual rights in the project.”329 
   
B. Compensable Indirect Expropriation 
 
According to Jeswald W. Salacuse, some arbitral decisions suggest important clues 
about the relationship between a compensable indirect expropriation and non-compensable 
regulatory action.330  These factors include: (1) the degree of intensity of interference with 
investor property rights; (2) the frustration of investors’ legitimate expectations; (3) lack 
of proportionality; and (4) non-transparency, arbitrariness, and discrimination.331 
 
(1) Degree of Interference with Investor Property Rights 
 
Two elements play an important role in evaluating the degree of interference with 
investor’s rights by governmental regulatory measures: the severity of the measure’s 
impact on the investor’s control over the investment and the duration of the regulatory 
measure.332 
 
a. Severity of Economic Impact  
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Tribunals deal with the degree of a governmental regulatory measure’s economic 
impact as a matter of essential fact.333  One question is whether the measures led to a 
“substantial deprivation” of the investor’s investment in practice.334   
 
The case of Philip Morris v Uruguay is illustrative. It discusses the fact that 
Uruguay has one of Latin America’s highest rates of smokers:335 each year over 5,000 
Uruguayans die from smoking-related diseases. 336   Smoking also has an economic 
impact:337 Uruguayan smokers spent large sums of money—an average of 20% of the 
national minimum wage—on smoking-related health costs. 338   As such, smoking has 
become a serious social problem in Uruguay and the country’s high smoking rate has had 
a negative effect on public health and economic growth.339   
 
To resolve this issue, Uruguay implemented anti-smoking policies and enacted its 
own legislation.340  For example, Uruguay initiated a national tobacco control campaign 
that led to a decrease in national smoking rates and started to regulate the tobacco 
industry. 341   Uruguay, furthermore, implemented strict regulatory measures to control 
tobacco, including a prohibition of smoking in enclosed spaces, increased taxation, and 
restrictions on advertising.342  As of 2000, the government of Uruguay had implemented 
many policies concerning the tobacco industry, and non-governmental expert groups had 
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emphasized prevention of tobacco use.343  Then, Uruguay became a party to the 2003 
“Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)” of the World Health Organization 
(WHO).344   
 
Philip Morris International eventually challenged some of Uruguay’s measures: 
Ordinance 514 enacted on August 18, 2008, commonly known as the Single Presentation 
Regulation or SPR, and Presidential Decree 287/009 enacted on June 15, 2009, commonly 
known as the 80/80 Regulation.345  SPR required the printing of graphic and textual anti-
smoking warnings on the lower half of cigarette packs.346  SPR also did not allow any 
cigarette brands to use variants:347 for instance, except for Marlboro Red, Philip Morris had 
to eliminate their Light, Blue, and Fresh Mint variants.  In addition, “the 80/80 Regulation 
mandated an increase in the size of health warnings on cigarette packages from 50 to 80 
per cent of the lower part of each of the main sides of every cigarette package.”348  Philip 
Morris International filed a suit against Uruguay at ICSID arbitration, “claiming that 
Uruguay expropriated its investment and denied it fair and equitable treatment under the 
Switzerland-Uruguay bilateral investment treaty (BIT).”349  
 
Philip Morris ultimately failed in their action.  The Tribunal dismissed the indirect 
expropriation claim on the 80/80 Regulation: 350   “A limitation to 20% of the space 
available to such purpose could not have a substantial effect on the Claimants’ business 
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because it consisted only in a limitation imposed by the law on the modalities of use of the 
relevant trademarks.”351  When it came to the other measure, according to the Tribunal, “in 
order to determine whether the SPR had an expropriatory character, Philip Morris’s 
business should be considered as a whole ‘since the measure affected its activities in their 
entirety.’” 352   From this perspective, the Tribunal concluded that the SPR did not 
substantially reduce the value of Philip Morris’s investment.353  As such, the Tribunal held 
that the claim regarding an indirect expropriation failed; 354  they stated, “as long as 
sufficient value remains after the implementation of the measure, there could be no indirect 
expropriation.”355  
 
b. Duration of the Governmental Measure 
 
Another important element in deciding whether a government’s measure 
constitutes an expropriation is the duration of the challenged measure.356  In the case of LG 
& E, the Tribunal said, “generally, the expropriation must be permanent, unless the 
investment’s successful development depends on the realization of certain activities at 
specific moments that may not endure variations.”357  As such, the Tribunal “observed that 
the effect of Argentina’s regulatory measures on the value of the Claimants’ investment 
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has not been permanent.”358  Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that Argentina’s actions 
were far from expropriation.359 
 
(2) Frustration of the Investor’s Legitimate Expectations 
 
Legitimate expectations play an important role in the interpretation of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard and in the determination of an indirect expropriation. 360 
Foreign investors decide to invest when they reasonably expect to gain economic 
benefits.361  Most governments will encourage these expectations in order to attract foreign 
investors’ investment.362   
 
According to the Tribunal in Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Metalclad 
believed that the government of Mexico possessed the absolute authority to permit a 
hazardous waste landfill.363   
 
One of the significant factors for an indirect expropriation is the investor’s 
legitimate expectation.364  Investors rely on a host State’s administrative measures, which 
offer clear communication about the content of various public decisions.365  However, 
sometimes, a host State does not provide a foreign investor with its exact intention:  in such 
situations, a host State’s action can give rise to the problem of legitimate expectations.  In 
                                                        
358 Id., at paras. 200. 
359 Id. 
360 See DOLZER, supra note 283, at 104. 
361 See SALACUSE, supra note 278, at 339. 
362 Id. 
363 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID CASE No. ARB(AF)/97/1, ¶ 28, (August 30, 2000). 
364 See ROMSON, supra note 160, at 276. 
365 Id. 
 69 
this regard, by providing clear rules and communicating with the investor about a permit’s 
revocation, the host State might simultaneously pursue both the investor’s interests and its 
own environmental policy.366 
 
(3) Lack of Proportionality 
 
“In order to decide whether a government’s measure amounts to an indirect 
expropriation, tribunals examined whether the challenged measure is reasonably 
proportional to the government’s purpose.” 367   Usually, if the measure imposes an 
excessive burden on foreign investors, a lack of proportionality might be found.368  For 
example, in Tecmed v Mexico the Tribunal considered “whether governmental regulatory 
measures are proportional to the public interest protected and take into account the 
protection granted to the investment.”369  The Tribunal stated, “There must be a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign 
investor and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriation measure.”370  “To evaluate 
such charge or weight, it is important how much the State actions affected the size of the 
ownership deprivation and whether or not any deprivation was compensated.”371 
 
(4) Non-Transparency, Arbitrariness, and Discrimination 
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To determine whether the State’s action constituted an indirect expropriation, the 
Tribunal also observes whether the challenged measure, or the process, was enacted 
unclearly, arbitrarily, or discriminatorily.372  For example, the Tribunal in Metalclad v 
Mexico found that Metalclad relied on Mexican federal governmental regulatory measures 
regarding their construction permit.373   
 
In April 1993, Metalclad, a U.S. corporation, had entered into an option-to-
purchase agreement with COTERIN, a Mexican corporation, for constructing a hazardous 
waste landfill.374  In May 1993, the government of San Luis Potosi permitted COTERIN a 
state land use permit.375  Then, “in August 1993, the National Ecological Institute granted 
COTERIN the federal permit for operation of the landfill.”376  One month later, Metalclad 
exercised its option and purchased COTERIN, the landfill site.377   
 
Metalclad then ran into difficulties. In October 1994, the Municipality of 
Guadalcazar ordered a halt to Metalclad’s construction, because Metalclad had not 
received a municipal construction permit.378  To protect the interests of Guadalcazar’s 
citizens, the municipality’s environmental representative requested Greenpeace Mexico’s 
assistance.379  Furthermore, to examine the Environmental Assessment of the landfill, civil 
society groups formed a citizen’s technical committee with geologists and civil 
engineers.380  Although federal officials had the full authority to authorize construction, 
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they suggested that Metalclad should apply for a local construction permit to maintain good 
relations with the Municipality. 381   Metalclad submitted an application for a local 
construction permit and started construction again. 382   However, the Municipality of 
Guadalcazar denied the application.383  
 
 The Tribunal reviewed the Mexican government’s actions leading to the refusal of 
the construction permit—and Metalclad’s inability to operate the hazardous waste 
landfill—to determine whether the Mexican actions amounted to an indirect 
expropriation.384  Metalclad asserted that the Municipality had no authority regarding all 
hazardous waste matters.385  On the other hand, Mexico argued that the Municipality had 
the authority to issue the construction permit.386  The Tribunal held that the Municipality 
denied the local construction permit without a timely, orderly, or substantive basis.387 
 
3. Environmental Regulations and Fair and Equitable Treatment 
 
Most international investment treaties have a provision requiring fair and equitable 
treatment (FET).388  Investors use this provision to challenge a host State’s environmental 
regulations and measures in investor-State dispute settlements.389  “It is, for example, a 
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common interpretation that the provision grants investors respect by the host State for their 
legitimate expectations concerning the regulatory environment for the investments.”390   
 
A. The Meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment 
 
The meaning of the phrase, fair and equitable treatment, is still mysterious.391  Even 
though it has been completely examined over the past few years, it has not yet been clearly 
defined.392  In many cases, tribunals have attempted to develop a definition for FET.393  In 
doing so, “tribunals have relied on concepts such as the investor’s expectation, 
transparency, justice, fairness, non-discrimination, arbitrariness, judicial propriety and 
natural justice.”394  On the other hand, this method has made the definition of FET overly 
general, and as such it cannot offer a useful standard for every case.395  Nevertheless, even 
though arbitral tribunals do not yet use a completely consistent term, arbitral tribunals have 
increasingly accepted these patterns of argumentation.396   
 
B. Legitimate Expectation 
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The protection of an investor’s legitimate expectation is an essential element of fair 
and equitable treatment.397  The protection of such expectations includes the permanence 
of promises and covenants that the investor has relied upon. 398   In addition, arbitral 
tribunals have found that the protection of expectations is closely related to “a certain level 
of stability and consistency in the legal framework of the host state.”399  The tribunal in 
Tecmed said that: 
 
            The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, 
free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign 
investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations 
that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies 
and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment 
and comply with such regulations. Any and all State actions conforming to 
such criteria should relate not only to the guidelines, directives or 
requirements issued, or the resolutions approved thereunder, but also to the 
goals underlying such regulations. The foreign investor also expects the 
host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any 
preexisting decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied upon by 
the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its 
commercial and business activities.400 
 
Changes to environmental regulations or permits might have an effect on an 
investor’s investment plan.401  Typically, these two situations can involve infringement on 
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the legitimate expectations of foreign investors; thus, this paper specifically needs to 
review both changes to environmental regulations and permits. 
 
(1) Changes in Environmental Regulations 
             
Every country’s environmental protection policy or measure is continuously 
changing402 as “states and local communities continuously develop new standards and 
goals for health and environmental protection.”403  New scientific knowledge and technical 
developments result in continuously changing environmental regulations and increases to 
health and environmental standards.404  For this reason, a host State will need to change its 
environmental regulations for the public interest.405   
 
The requirements on a State that changes its environmental regulations will vary. 
Changes in environmental regulation do not inherently intrude on a foreign investor’s 
legitimate expectation if there have been no concrete commitments between a host State 
and foreign investors.406  In such situations, the host State can change its environmental 
regulations without limitation, if the change helps public interests such as environmental 
protection.407  However, if changes to environmental regulations will have a substantial 
effect on an investor’s economic benefit, the host State should compensate for the 
investor’s loss of benefit. 408   Therefore, when a host State changes or modifies its 
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environmental regulation, it should consider whether the changed environmental regulation 
considerably affects an investor’s economic benefit. 
 
There is a good example of a change in governmental regulation.  In the case of 
Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, several 
international companies were investing in Bolivia. A US company, Guaracachi America, 
Inc. (GAI), and a British company, Rurelec Plc., invested in the Bolivian company, 
Empresa Electrica Guaracachi S.A. (EGSA).409  Rurelec also indirectly owned Guaracachi 
through a chain of BVI companies. The Claimants, Guaracachi and Rurelec, went to ICSID 
arbitration against Bolivia under the authority of the USA-Bolivia and UK-Bolivia BITs, 
with a grievance based on the 2010 nationalization of Guaracachi’s 50.001% shareholding 
in Empresa Electrica Guaracachi S.A. and of additional assets owned by Rurelec’s 
subsidiary, Energia para Sistemas Aislados Energis S.A.410  
 
Since 1990, Bolivia had initiated extensive reforms to attract foreign investors and 
had established a new regulatory structure that would allow the private business sector, in 
particular, to participate in the electricity industry.411  “The cornerstone of the regulatory 
framework was Law No. 1604 of 1994, (hereinafter, the ‘Electricity Law’), which 
established the basic framework for the supply of electricity.” 412   “In addition, an 
independent entity was created, the Electricity Superintendency (Superintendencia de 
Electricidad, hereinafter, the ‘SSDE’), charged with the enforcement of the Electricity Law 
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and the management of the electricity sector, and the National Power Dispatch Committee 
(Comit Nacional de Despacho de Cargo, hereinafter, the ‘CNDC’), which was subject to 
the oversight of the SSDE.”413  The new regulatory framework involved warranties on the 
basis of efficiency, transparency, and quality.414   
 
The Claimants alleged that Bolivia’s maintenance of the regulatory framework 
made them liable. 415   On the basis of the developed regulatory framework and the 
guarantees, GAI had invested in EGSA from the beginning of the 1990s.416  Later, Rurelec 
decided to invest in EGSA, also based on the existing regulatory framework and those 
guarantees.417  According to the Claimants, the regulatory change had a negative effect on 
the profit of most private companies, such as EGSA.418  On the other hand, according to 
the Respondent, the main purpose of the regulatory change was to find a way to institute a 
proper pricing system, based on the principle of supply efficiency, and to pursue reasonable 
environmental policy goals.419  
 
BITs usually include a clause that offers fair and equitable treatment (FET) to 
investors, and the Claimants claimed that Bolivia was in violation of the provision. 
“According to the Claimants, the fair and equitable treatment standard is recognized as a 
flexible concept, affording protection when State action is considered unfair.”420  The 
investor can demand protection of their interests if the host State’s action is in bad faith or 
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has malicious intent. 421   At the time Claimants invested in Bolivia, they relied on 
fundamental principles that considered the economic feasibility of the investment as the 
most important factor, and they relied on the maintenance of the regulatory framework 
governing spot prices. 422   However, according to the Claimants, these fundamental 
principles were changed in 2008, and, in the end, the measures frustrated the investors’ 
legitimate expectations of stability and certainty.423  
 
According to Bolivia, the Claimants interpreted the FET standard too broadly.424  
The purpose of the FET standard is, indeed, to protect investor’s interests but with a limited 
scope.425  “Thus, in the absence of a prior commitment by the State, the investor cannot 
hold a legitimate expectation that the State will not exercise its power to modify the legal 
framework applicable to the investment and no violation of the standard arises.”426  To find 
a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard under the BITs, the Claimants had to 
demonstrate that Bolivia’s modified regulation was unreasonable or unjustified.427  “The 
modifications did not constitute ‘the setting of prices that do not remunerate the investment 
made nor allow reasonable profit to be granted,’ nor was this their intent.”428  “The changes 
still allowed for reasonable profit to the point that even dividends were possible.”429  Thus, 
Bolivia’s actions with respect to the capacity payment, and the method for calculation of 
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the spot price, did not violate the rules,430 and the Tribunal said that GAI’s investment was 
not related to Bolivia’s previous regulatory framework.431  
 
The issue is whether the government of Bolivia had created a clear and objective 
expectation, based on specific commitments, when the Claimants (investors) decided to 
invest. According to Bolivia, “it made no guarantee that it would not nationalize the 
electricity sector, and, in any event, the Claimants have not submitted any evidence of 
such.”432  In addition, regarding the claim relating to spot price, the Tribunal reasoned “it 
is not expected to determine the price that should be applied to generators, but rather to 
determine whether the modification by Bolivia of the regulatory framework in relation to 
spot prices frustrated the Claimants’ legitimate expectations in breach of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard.” 433   As a consequence, in order to obtain an objective 
expectation, investors should check if there are specific commitments between investors 
and a State—this is because, after investors make an investment, investment situations such 
as modification of regulatory frameworks are likely to occur often.  Therefore, when 
investors invest in foreign countries, they should know that they might have to bear the 
burden or risk if there is a modification of the regulatory framework. 
 
(2) Changes in Governmental Permits 
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            “The environmental permit in itself a strong representation of the host State 
concerning the legality of the activity.” 434   Thus, an environmental permit inherently 
contains a risk of infringement on the foreign investor’s legitimate expectation.435   
 
            There are two good examples of changes to environmental permits.  In the case of 
Metalclad v Mexico, the Tribunal reviewed whether the Mexican government’s acts 
leading to the denial of a construction permit and subsequent inability to operate a 
hazardous waste landfill constituted a breach of NAFTA’s Article 1105 on minimum 
international standards of treatment. 436   The Tribunal found that Metalclad believed 
government officials’ representations concerning all aspects of the investment.437  For 
example, the municipality required Metalclad to hold a local permit and suggested that it 
would likely be issued.438  The Tribunal held that the investor was entitled to rely on the 
representations of the federal officials, and therefore Mexico had violated the fair and 
equitable standard; 439  the Tribunal said, “Mexico failed to ensure a transparent and 
predictable framework for Metalclad’s business planning and investment.” 440   The 
Tribunal also found that the Municipality’s action was not related to the actual construction 
but was instead linked to social and environmental concerns concerning the site’s use as a 
hazardous waste landfill.441  The Tribunal held that, because there were not any clear rules 
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on the process for obtaining a construction permit, this constituted a breach of Article 
1105.442  
 
Furthermore, the Tribunal reasoned that Metalclad began constructing the landfill, 
because it relied upon the representations of the federal government.443  According to 
Metalclad, “federal officials said that the Municipality would have no legal basis for 
denying the permit.”444  Moreover, “when the permit was denied at a meeting of the 
Municipal Town Council, Metalclad had not received any notice and opportunity to 
appear.”445  “The absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal 
construction permit, as well as the absence of any established or procedure as to the manner 
of handling applications for a municipal construction permit amounts to a failure on the 
part of Mexico to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for Metalclad’s business 
planning and investment.”446   
 
The Tribunal’s decision and rationales are worthy of criticism. The Tribunal did 
not consider the health and safety of the citizens of Guadalcazar at all.  The Municipality 
denied the local construction permit because it perceived that the hazardous waste landfill 
would have a negative effect on environmental protection.447  Citizens of the Municipality 
had no choice but to oppose the landfill’s construction, because the site’s use as a hazardous 
waste landfill was clearly detrimental to their health. I think that the Tribunal 
overemphasized the investors’ legitimate expectations for stability and certainty.   
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The other example of changes to environmental permits involves the case of 
TECMED v Mexico.  Applying a provision in the Spain-Mexico BIT that guaranteed fair 
and equitable treatment, the Tribunal concluded that the provision required transparency 
and protection of the investor’s basic expectations.448  It noted, in particular, “the foreign 
investor also expects the host State to act consistently.”449  The Tribunal concluded that 
Mexico’s actions frustrated the investor’s expectations:450 the actions were ambiguous and 
uncertain, which impeded the right of the investor to have an advance assessment of the 
legal situation and plan its business activity accordingly.451  The Tribunal found that the 
Environmental Protection Agency failed to “report, in clear and express terms of its 
intention to deny renewal.”452   
 
There was ambiguity surrounding the requirements that TECMED had to meet. 
TECMED believed that the government of Mexico had the authority to renew the operation 
of the landfill.453  However, the Environmental Protection Agency canceled the permit to 
operate the landfill and ordered its closure, because TECMED breached some terms of 
environmental regulations.454  The Tribunal concluded that TECMED’s violation of the 
environmental regulations was insignificant.455  Besides, the community group and civil 
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society group’s opposition to the operation of the landfill was not a serious social 
situation.456   
 
This decision of the Tribunal is worthy of criticism. The landfill included hazardous 
toxic waste, and it was close to a residential area.  Even though TECMED’s violation of 
environmental regulations was trivial, it could bring about serious environmental 
contamination and threaten citizens’ health and safety.  I think that the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s measure—cancellation of permission—to protect the public health 
was considerably justified. 
 
C. Non-Discrimination 
 
Unfair and inequitable treatment may result from state authorities’ discriminatory 
behaviors toward foreign investors.457  The plain meaning of fair and equitable treatment 
indicates that governmental regulatory measures that are discriminatory towards an 
investor covered by an investment treaty will be violations of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard.458   In other words, fair and equitable treatment excludes arbitrary 
governmental actions against investors.459  Inevitably, States justify their actions as a way 
of protecting the public interest; on the other hand, the investors whose interests have been 
impeded claim that the States’ measures were arbitrary and discriminatory.460  Arbitral 
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tribunals compare the types of treatment that investors received and look at whether the 
state action has an arbitrary effect on investors.461  The tribunal in S.D. Myers said that: 
 
            The Tribunal considers that a breach of Article 1105 occurs only when it is 
shown that an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner 
that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the 
international perspective. That determination must be made in the light of 
the high measure of deference that international law generally extends to 
the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders. 
The determination must also take into account any specific rules of 
international law that are applicable to the case.462 
 
In the case of Philip Morris v Uruguay, Philip Morris alleged that the Challenged 
Measures, such as the SPR and the 80/80 regulations, were subjective.463  The Tribunal 
started their fair and equitable treatment (FET) analysis by addressing Philip Morris’s 
allegations.464  To this end, the Tribunal reviewed each measure along with all the relevant 
circumstances, including opinions regarding public policy determinations by national 
regulatory agencies.465  According to the Tribunal, “the SPR was not an arbitrary, unjust, 
or discriminatory measure but rather a reasonable measure.”466  In addition, “the 80/80 
Regulation was a reasonable measure adopted in good faith to implement an obligation 
assumed by the State under the FCTC.”467  As such, Uruguay abided by both its national 
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and international legal obligations in protecting the public’s health.468  The Tribunal further 
stated that both measures had been enacted in good faith and had been executed in a non-
discriminatory manner.469  Moreover, the Tribunal pointed out that the measures were 
adopted with scientific evidence, because they were based on the FCTC process.470  
 
 The Tribunal’s decision will have important ramifications. The government of 
Uruguay implemented strict regulations on the tobacco industry to protect the public health 
in 2009; the Tribunal in this dispute rejected Philip Morris International’s claims that its 
investment in Uruguay had been expropriated and that Uruguay’s measures of tobacco 
control were arbitrary.471  From my point of view, Uruguay’s high smoking rate had 
become a serious social problem.  For this reason, Uruguay implemented its domestic 
measures against the tobacco industry to resolve smoking-related problems.  According to 
the Tribunal, the measures were a reasonable exercise of the country’s sovereign right to 
protect the public health.472  I believe this decision will affect other cases involving similar 
issues.  Specifically, in order to protect public goals, such as the fundamental rights to 
health and environmental protection, it is likely that States will enforce measures that may 
regulate investors’ interests.   
 
D. Fair Procedure 
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The new US Model BIT and many US FTAs explicitly stipulate the scope of 
application of the fair and equitable treatment.473  “Fair and equitable treatment demands 
that judicial and administrative procedures are shaped and exercised in a way that endows 
the investor with the possibility to bring bear adequately his rights and interests.”474  Most 
tribunals examine this aspect of the fair and equitable treatment in situations involving 
denial of access to courts or inadequate and unjust procedures.475   For example, the tribunal 
in Waste Management v Mexico defined a violation of the fair and equitable treatment as 
“involving a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety-
as might be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings.”476  
Furthermore, in Loewen v USA the tribunal found that “manifest injustice in the sense of a 
lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends a sense of judicial propriety is 
enough to identify a breach of fair and equitable treatment.”477 
 
E. Transparency 
 
Transparency requires that the host state’s investment-related legal framework and 
procedures be as applicable to foreign investment as to domestic investment. 478   The 
tribunal in Metalclad referred, for the first time, to the principle of transparency as an 
element of fair and equitable treatment, while the tribunal in Tecmed interpreted the FET 
“by putting it in the context of more concrete procedural principles and rights and 
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expanding it to include the investor’s legitimate expectation.”479  In Metalclad v Mexico, 
the Tribunal defined the concept of transparency as the idea that “all relevant legal 
requirements for the purpose of investing should be capable of being readily known to all 
investors.”480  Meanwhile, in Tecmed v Mexico the tribunal considered that: 
 
This provision of the Agreement, in light of the good faith principle 
established by international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide 
to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic 
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make 
the investment. The foreign investor expects the host state to act in a 
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparent in its that 
will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and 
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and 
comply with such regulations.481 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
           Foreign investors can bring a claim against a host State to international arbitration 
if the host State violates a treaty that they agreed upon.  Typically, when the host State’s 
governmental measures amount to an indirect expropriation, or intrude upon the provisions 
of fair and equitable treatment, foreign investors file an action against the host State.  This 
Chapter also discusses the importance of legitimate expectation—in the interpretation of 
the FET and in the determination of an indirect expropriation—by analyzing many 
investment arbitration cases.  Furthermore, if changes to environmental regulations or 
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permits substantially deprive foreign investors of their economic benefits, the host State 
should compensate them for the loss of their economic benefits.   
  
Every country can change its environmental regulations to improve public interests; 
however, if the purpose of the governmental regulations is not reasonable, or the necessity 
for the governmental measures is weak, then foreign investors’ legitimate expectations 
could be impeded.  Furthermore, if there are commitments between foreign investors and 
the host State, they should abide by the commitments.  As a result, it is important to find 
the proper balance between the investors’ expectations and the State’s need to change 
environmental regulations or permits. 
 
 In the case of changes to environmental regulations or permits, investor-State 
disputes have stated that a host State’s authority should provide investors with exact 
explanations about rules, and information about governance structure, to avoid unclear 
communication. Furthermore, those in the investors’ position should confirm which 
authority has the power to grant the relevant regulation or permit. By promoting 
interactions between investors and government authorities, a host State can decrease 
unnecessary constraints on environmental policy, while foreign investors can secure their 
legitimate expectations.  
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CHAPTER IV. SUGGESTIONS TO BALANCE BETWEEN U.S. INVESTORS 
AND KOREAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
 
Environmental protection policies inherently involve long-term uncertainty and 
considerable regulatory risks, which interfere with foreign investors’ legitimate 
expectations.  South Korea’s problems in this area include the government’s inconsistent 
environmental policies and unilateral environmental policy enforcement.  Furthermore, 
frequently occurring political corruption in South Korea reduces public concern.  These are 
all elements that can not only decrease the transparency of Korean environmental policy 
but also intrude on U.S. investors’ need for predictability regarding regulatory stability.  
On the other hand, protection of U.S. investors’ interests could constrain Korean 
environmental policy.  Despite the fact that the investor-State dispute settlement system 
inherently has many defects, protecting both U.S. investors’ interests and Korean 
environmental policy is important.  Therefore, to harmonize these two important interests, 
this dissertation will suggest ways to reconcile Korean environmental protection policies 
and US investors’ interests under the KORUS FTA; the following sections detail the 
possible suggestions. 
 
1. Amicus Curiae Participation: An Increase in Third-Party Participation 
 
A. Characteristics of Amicus Curiae Participation 
 
There are several characteristics inherent to amicus curiae participation.  The rules 
for proceedings in investor-State arbitration are similar to those for commercial arbitration, 
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including certain privacy and confidentiality rights. 482   However, unlike commercial 
arbitration, investor-State arbitration often examines the public interest—including issues 
such as environmental protection—and implicates “government regulation aimed at the 
protection of public welfare human rights, health and safety, and labor laws.”483   Investor-
State arbitration pursues not only speed but also confidentiality: “arbitration offers parties 
better efficiency by proceeding outside national judicial systems, because the resulting 
arbitral awards are not normally subject to any appeal.”484  As a result, the proceeds and 
contents of arbitral tribunals can be kept secret—completely confidential between both of 
the parties.485  Finally, investment arbitration tribunals initially involved no third-party 
participation; 486  however, they eventually allowed limited third-party participation, 
because of continuing public pressure and public opposition to the investment arbitration 
system.487  
 
B. Disadvantage of Amicus Curiae Participation 
 
Amicus curiae play an important role in arbitration proceedings; however, there 
have been many criticisms about them.488  “First, third-party participation can increase the 
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practical burdens on the disputing parties.”489  In one case, the “tribunal emphasized the 
need to ensure that third-party participation does not impose any additional burdens on the 
parties or the arbitral process more generally.”490  Second, several commentators pointed 
out that greater amicus curiae participation in investor-State disputes is likely to bring about 
rising costs and delays.491  Amicus curiae participation not only increases the cost but also 
creates needless delay for the parties, because parties must then spend a great deal of time 
analyzing and responding to the amicus curiae submissions.492  As such, the amicus curiae 
should perform a wide range of research before filing their amicus submissions.493   
 
Arbitrators in investment disputes started restricting third parties’ participation in 
disputes to written amicus briefs.494  If third-party participation could pass beyond the 
submission of written briefs—for example, if third parties could seek the discovery of 
documents, be involved in evidence taking, or participate in oral arguments—it would lay 
an excessive burden on the efficiency of the process.495  Furthermore, extending third-party 
participation under such circumstances would undermine some of the advantages of 
investor-State disputes, such as being quicker and more cost-efficient.496  Finally, increased 
third-party participation would likely weaken the confidentiality and privacy in an investor-
State dispute.497  For example, investors fear that increased third-party participation would 
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endanger their ability to keep sensitive information as secrets, such as trade secrets and 
confidential matters.498   
 
C. Advantage of Amicus Curiae Participation 
 
Although extending amicus curiae participation beyond merely providing written 
amicus briefs has several disadvantages in investment arbitration proceedings, it can also 
contribute to facilitating positive investor-State dispute settlements.  This is because 
investment arbitration deals with both the investor’s interest and the public interest;499 
consequently, the arbitral tribunals have supported third-party participation in arbitral 
proceedings.500  There are two reasons why investment treaty arbitrations have required 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as amici curiae:501  first is for their ability to 
interpret “an investment treaty to increase harmonization and consistency and second is to 
analyze the subject matters…within the dispute.”502  The civil societies strongly support 
not only the protection of the public interest—such as environmental issues, labor welfare, 
and human rights—but also the development of procedural openness in investment 
arbitration. 503   Non-governmental organizations provide special skills, as well as 
knowledge concerning important issues of public policy, within the dispute.504  Without 
their participation, arbitrators and disputing parties might not proficiently deal with some 
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issues, “such as ecological studies, environmental impact assessments, or cost-benefit 
analyses regarding environmental policy.”505  As a result, the NGOs play an important role 
in reaching a meaningful decision by the tribunal.506   
 
From the perspective of the State, the State is not able to prepare for all relevant 
controversies that might confront the arbitrators.507  Several factors might bring about this 
situation:508 for instance, “the State might lack knowledge, evidence, or resources on some 
issues.”509  In these situations, “amicus submissions provide factual, legal, and technical 
information to the arbitral tribunal.”510  Therefore, the participation of the amicus curiae 
improves the quality of the award.511  Moreover, transparency has a positive effect on 
investment arbitral proceedings:512 for instance, it reinforces the public credibility, and it 
enhances the acceptability of the investment arbitral tribunal’s decision.513  The increased 
transparency through the amicus submissions also provides a chance to offer greater 
reliability to international investment arbitrations.514  Thus, amicus briefs play an important 
role in maintaining the legitimacy of investment arbitrations.515 
 
Amicus curiae participation might improve the quality of awarded legal remedies 
and promote procedural transparency:  in this respect, broadly expanding amicus curiae 
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participation would help meet the need for better remedies and transparency when investor-
State arbitrations confront important public issues.  Environmental issues that investment 
arbitration tribunals deal with are very complicated.  For example, environmental experts 
might be required to evaluate the environmental value of particular regions.  As such, 
investment arbitration tribunals need environmental experts’ opinions and participation to 
draw reasonable conclusions.  For these reasons, it is necessary for third parties acting as 
environmental experts to participate in public hearings and have access to important 
documents related to the suits in the investment arbitral proceeding.  However, most of the 
investment arbitration cases have enabled third parties only to file written amicus curiae 
submissions.   
 
2. The Application of Proportionality Analysis 
 
A. Concept of Proportionality Principle 
 
Proportionality describes a proportional relation of one part to another; it is 
fundamentally connected to the concepts of equilibrium and balancing.516  This analysis, 
as developed by the European Court of Human Rights, has influenced the approach of 
investor-state arbitration tribunals when “applying treaty provisions to governmental 
measures that allegedly amount to indirect expropriation.” 517  Arbitrators use the 
proportionality test to estimate the impact of the State’s measures on the investment.518   
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Essentially, international investment treaties pursue two important goals:519 The 
first purpose is for States not to discriminate against foreign nationals and corporations.520  
The other purpose is for States not to appropriate the foreigners’ property without 
compensation.521  However, when a State fails to fulfill these treaty purposes, it can lead 
to neutral third-party adjudication through arbitral tribunals. 522   The principle of 
proportionality is a useful method to solve such conflicts in many domestic and some 
international courts.523  Providing for an appropriate balance between individual rights and 
the public interest is its most significant purpose:524 in other words, to provide for a fair 
balance between investors’ rights and the public interest.525  Some tribunals have already 
used the principle of proportionality.526  On the other hand, most of those tribunals have 
not described why the principle of proportionality analysis was needed, or how it applied 
in real cases.527 
 
B. The Application of the Proportionality Principle in TECMED SA v. Mexico Case 
 
Arbitral Tribunals mainly focus on the question of whether the State’s conduct is 
reasonable and whether it is associated with rational policies.528   Unfortunately, most 
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arbitral awards have not explained well what the notion of reasonableness has meant for 
their particular Tribunal.529  Only some awards explain that the reasonableness of a State’s 
measure is to be determined by balancing the interests of the foreign investor and the host 
state:530 one of the best examples is the TECMED case.   
 
In the case of TECMED SA v. Mexico, the tribunal clearly explained an elaborate 
concept of proportionality.531  In its assessment of an alleged expropriation, the tribunal 
required “a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the effects and the goal of a 
measure, and that the relevant factors must be weighted when trying to assess the 
proportionality of the action adopted with respect to the purpose pursed by such 
measure.” 532   When the principle of proportionality is applied, first, the case should 
examine whether both the private interest and the public interest exist or whether there are 
other conflicting interests: 533  The principle of proportionality can balance conflicting 
interests and restrain the right of discretion.534  Second, the case should examine whether 
the host country has broad discretion to regulate investments by choosing different 
measures;535 essentially, when deciding which measure to utilize, States tend to have wide 
discretion in matters related to the national or public interests.536  However, the government 
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cannot properly consider a measure if the adopted measure’s effect would be more 
excessive than necessary or if the need for the measure drops considerably.537   
 
In Tecmed v Mexico, the benefit to Tecmed (investor) was impeded considerably.538  
However, Mexico had the power to define “the issues that affect its public policy or the 
interests of society as a whole, as well as the actions that will be implemented to protect 
such values.” 539   The case is illustrative of the fact that when the principle of 
proportionality is applied, an arbitral Tribunal can examine whether the regulatory measure 
breaches a balance between private rights and public interests, and they can also examine 
whether there was an abuse of regulatory power to promote the host State’s potential and 
economic interests.540 
 
It appears that several tribunals used proportionality analysis in determining 
whether a certain regulatory measure amounted to an indirect expropriation or to fair and 
equitable treatment.  As one scholar observed in the application of this proportionality 
analysis, “it is obvious that the pendulum will not necessarily always swing in the direction 
of the investor’s interest.” 541   Ultimately, the public interest in matters such as 
environmental protection should be balanced against the investor’s interest.  Thus, 
international investment tribunals should use the proportionality analysis continuously and 
obligatorily when examining whether the negative financial impact of regulatory measures 
on foreign investments is proportional to the public interest. 
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3. Increase in Transparency of Korean Environmental Policy  
 
As mentioned in Chapter II, South Korea’s rankings for policy stability and 
transparency in government policymaking are both low, according to the World Economic 
Forum. These factors—South Korea’s policy instability and opaque government 
policymaking—are related to insufficient national consensus and public participation.  In 
other words, policy-makers do not collect various public opinions before implementing 
new environmental regulations.  As such, the problem of South Korea’s unilateral 
environmental policy enforcement remains to be solved.  Political corruption also has a 
negative effect on environmental policy in South Korea;  “Political corruption’s effect in 
reducing the strength of environmental programs is particularly pronounced in situations 
where manufacturing industry is politically mobilized.”542   This improper relationship 
between politicians and the business community continuously affects the environmental 
policymaking processes in South Korea. 
 
Reinforcing public participation in environmental decision-making processes is 
very important to increase the transparency of environmental policy.  “Transparency can 
explain how decisions are made and who influences those decisions.”543  In the case of 
Philip Morris, Uruguay’s high smoking rate brought about many social problems related 
to the nation’s public health.544  As of 2000, the government of Uruguay had implemented 
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many policies concerning the tobacco industry and non-governmental expert groups had 
started to emphasize prevention of tobacco use. 545   The government of Uruguay 
implemented anti-smoking policies and enacted its own legislation: 546   “The new 
regulation mandated an increase in the size of health warnings on cigarette packages from 
50 to 80 per cent of the lower part of each of the main sides of every cigarette package.”547  
 
The Philip Morris case ultimately gave South Korea’s policy makers some good 
ideas.  For example, whenever the Korean government needs changes to environmental 
regulations, it should provide the public with correct information and reasonable rationales 
for the changes to the environmental regulations and gain a public consensus.  I think that 
such a step-by-step procedure prior to enacting new policies would protect foreign 
investors’ legitimate expectations. 
 
4. Explanation Regarding the Introduction of Policies 
 
Arbitration tribunals determine indirect expropriation on a case-by-case and fact-
specific basis.548  Therefore, evidence preservation and evidence related to the proof of 
content are very important.  For example, states will be better able to explain why policies 
were enacted if records of the procedures and legislative histories associated with the 
introduction of those policies are well preserved.  This legislative intent could provide 
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states with an important component in their defense against a claim of appropriation at 
arbitration.   
 
In practice, even though information on pending and recent legislation is available 
from the government website of Korea or the national archives of Korea, a problem is that 
the meaning of terminology and the intended purpose of the legislation can be ambiguous.  
Furthermore, there is still not enough information about legislative history in the 
Congressional records.  Thus, the Korean government should not only provide useful 
background information about legislative records to the public but also describe the 
legislature’s intent and purposes regarding the legislation, along with minority views.   
 
In most investor-state arbitrations, states or arbitrators examine statutes that were 
foundational to the introduction of the contested policies.  Therefore, having extensive 
records can enable states to explain why the disputed policies were introduced, as well as 
the legislative intent behind them.  Given these points, the government of South Korea 
should record the legislative purpose and intent of their statutes in order to provide specific 
and concrete evidence for the underlying rationale of their policies.  Furthermore, by being 
able to adequately record statutes’ legislative intent and purpose, the South Korean 
government might also be in a better position to clearly define and interpret its own 
environmental policies.   
 
5. Clear Definition of Indirect Expropriation  
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The definition and application of an indirect expropriation is often ambiguous and 
difficult; it is thus necessary for the provisions’ definitive and interpretive criteria to be 
clear.  For example, under the KORUS FTA, “the agreement’s expropriation provisions 
have been clarified in two annexes to ensure that they are consistent with U.S. legal 
principles and practice, including a clarification that non-discriminatory regulatory actions 
designed and applied to protect the public welfare do not constitute indirect expropriation 
‘except in rare circumstances.’”549  However, we never know whether and to what extent 
the rare circumstances will be found: only dispute arbitrators are able to decide.   
 
When interpreting the KORUS FTA, the tribunal confronts interpretive difficulties 
inherent in determining the parties' intent and the textual meaning of the treaty's provisions.  
By using extra-textual sources and drafting history, which reveals the parties’ underlying 
intent and purpose, drafters and interpreters can address the interpretive difficulties.550  
Furthermore, an investment treaty signed by two countries’ agreement should be 
interpreted in the light of its object and purpose as agreed to by both parties’ mutual 
consent.551  In this regard, both parties need a consensus on models or methods; the treaty 
should not be interpreted in accordance with only one party's intent. 552   Finally, the 
meaning of the specific terms used is important, because the text of treaties is often 
deliberately ambiguous;553 deliberate ambiguity promotes international cooperation and 
                                                        
549 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Final Environmental Review United States-Korea Free Trade 
Agreement, at 22, Sept. 2011, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/182921.pdf. 
550 See Kelly Connolly, Say What You Mean: Improved Drafting Resources as a Means for Increasing the 
Consistency of Interpretation of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1579, 1609-1610 
(2007). 
551 Id. 
552 Id. 
553 See Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 U. Cin. 
L. Rev. 1243, 1275 (2005). 
 101 
provides leaders with political flexibility when seeking ratification of a treaty.554  This 
ambiguity, however, is fatal when seeking reliable and consistent interpretations in 
arbitration.555  However, by using a compilation of key terminology, both parties can 
clarify ambiguous treaty provisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
554 Id. at 1275-76.  
555 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation reviewed whether there is a possibility that U.S. investors will 
bring a claim against South Korea for infringing their property rights, because the Korean 
government’s environmental measures may amount to an indirect expropriation or a breach 
of fair and equitable treatment under the KORUS FTA.  In reaching this review, first, this 
dissertation discussed changes to environmental regulations.  Every country can change its 
environmental regulations because new concerns about environmental quality, along with 
the development of new technology, can result in changing needs for environmental 
regulations.  However, these changes to environmental regulations can either guarantee or 
decrease foreign investors’ predictability.  Therefore, entities in the State’s position should 
consider the necessity for changes to environmental regulations or permits and how such 
changes might affect foreign investors’ predictability.   
 
Second, this dissertation introduced important elements for a good environmental 
policy design.  According to Sterner, various elements such as sustainability, equity 
concerns, and transparency are needed to properly satisfy environmental goals.  States can 
create more desirable environmental policies through a harmonization of these various 
elements.  However, Korea’s environmental policy has many problems.   
 
Third and last, this dissertation examined the disadvantages of Korea’s 
environmental policy.  As mentioned in Chapter II, Korea’s rankings for policy instability, 
transparency of government policymaking, and burden of government regulation are low.  
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The first reason for these rankings appears to be the government’s inconsistent 
environmental policies and unilateral policy enforcement.  As such, a lack of national 
consensus and public participation arises in the policymaking process.  The second reason 
for the rankings is that political factors have a negative effect on the environmental 
policymaking processes; for instance, the previous administration’s environmental policy 
might be abolished or postponed by a new administration.  The last reason involves 
political corruption:  the big corporations, such as Samsung, support the government and 
obtain improper benefits from it.  This improper relationship between politicians and 
business might reduce the transparency of the government’s policymaking processes.  
These are all elements that can reduce U.S. investors’ predictability. 
 
Based upon the analysis above, I conclude that U.S. investors are likely to file an 
action against the Korean government in international arbitration, because the 
government’s measures amount to either an indirect expropriation or a breach of fair and 
equitable treatment.  Besides which, if the government’s environmental measures 
substantially infringe upon U.S. investors’ economic benefits, the government of Korea 
should compensate them for their economic loss. 
 
 
International investment treaties provide protective provisions for foreign investors 
to insure against State’s regulatory risks.  On the other hand, investment treaties also 
include provisions for the protection of public interests, such as environmental conditions, 
when it comes to permissible governmental measures.  The KORUS FTA has similar 
provisions regarding the protection of foreign investors and public interests.  As a result, 
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the tension between these two important interests naturally arises.  For this reason, this 
dissertation suggests ways to balance between U.S. investors’ interests and Korean 
environmental protection policy.   
 
The current ISDS system inherently possesses many formational problems, such as 
a lack of transparency and the fact that the appointed arbitrators’ untrustworthiness can 
result in constraints on a host State’s regulatory space.  This dissertation’s first suggestion 
in this regard is to increase third party participation to increase the transparency of the 
current ISDS system.  Arbitrators should allow third party participation, as environmental 
experts, to extend beyond the submission of written amicus briefs: permitting not only their 
participation in public hearings, but also granting access to important documents.  The 
second suggestion involves the application of proportionality analysis.  The appointed 
arbitrators have the authority to interpret and apply investment treaties; however, each 
arbitrator interprets and applies investment treaties in a different manner.  For this reason, 
it is difficult to foresee their decisions.  It is very important that foreign investors’ interests 
should be balanced against public interests, such as health and environmental protection.  
However, one problem is that only some international investment arbitrations have used 
the proportionality analysis.  Better results would be obtained if they used this principle 
continuously and obligatorily in determining whether the government measures amounted 
to an indirect expropriation or a breach of fair and equitable treatment.  The third suggestion 
involves an increase in transparency regarding Korean environmental policy.  South 
Korea’s unstable and unclear governmental policymaking triggers a lack of public 
participation.  Increasing the transparency of Korean environmental policymaking would 
reinforce public participation in environmental decision-making processes.  As a result, 
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this idea could result in clearer predictability for U.S. investors.  The fourth suggestion is 
that there should be a clear explanation regarding the introduction of policies.  In most 
investor-State arbitrations, arbitrators have examined statutes’ legislative purpose and 
intent.  In South Korea’s position, if records of the procedures and legislative histories—
that are the basis for the introduction of their policies—are well preserved, South Korea 
will be able to explain why those policies were introduced, along with providing the 
intended purpose of the legislation.  By providing a clear explanation regarding the 
introduction of their policies, Korean environmental policy could be prevented from facing 
arbitration-imposed constraints.  The dissertation’s last suggestion in this regard is the need 
for clear treaty provisions.  Unclear treaty provisions have a negative effect, resulting in 
inconsistent treaty interpretations within arbitrations.  Thus, both of the parties that agreed 
upon the treaty should clarify ambiguous treaty provisions.  
 
Considering all of the above, there is a high possibility that U.S. investors will bring 
a claim against the government of Korea to the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, because the government’s environmental measures amounted to an 
indirect expropriation and a breach of fair and equitable treatment.  If the government of 
South Korea loses such a suit, U.S. investors could strike down Korean environmental law 
and policy.  For this reason, as mentioned previously, this dissertation has suggested ways 
to balance between U.S. investors’ rights and Korean environmental protection policy. 
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